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MALI: AVOIDING ESCALATION 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In a little more than two months, Mali’s political regime 
has been demolished. An armed rebellion launched on 17 
January 2012 expelled the army from the north while a 
coup deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) on 
22 March. These two episodes ushered Mali into an un-
precedented crisis that also threatens regional political sta-
bility and security. An external armed intervention would 
nevertheless involve considerable risks. The international 
community must support dialogue between the armed and 
unarmed actors in the north and south that favours a polit-
ical solution to the crisis. The Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) must readjust its media-
tion efforts to avoid aggravating the already deep fault lines 
in Malian society. Strengthening the credibility of transi-
tional institutions to restore the state and its security forces 
is an absolute priority. Finally, coordinated regional securi-
ty measures must be taken to prevent once foreign groups 
from turning northern Mali into a new front in the “war on 
terror”. 
In Bamako, the capital, the transitional framework agreed 
by ECOWAS and the junta, composed of junior officers led 
by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, has failed to establish 
undisputed political arrangements. The junta has rallied 
grassroots support by capitalising on the anger of a signif-
icant minority of the population towards ATT’s govern-
ment, with which it associates the interim president, Dion-
counda Traoré, former head of the National Assembly. 
Traoré was physically attacked, and could have been killed, 
by supporters of the coup leaders in the presidential palace 
on 21 May 2012. Flown to France for treatment, he had 
still not returned to Bamako in mid-July. The destruction 
of the military apparatus and the weakness of the transi-
tional authorities, notably the government of Prime Minis-
ter Cheick Modibo Diarra, soon to be reshuffled, impede 
the Malian forces’ ability to restore territorial integrity in 
the short term and avoid serious collapse. 
In the north, the Tuareg group that launched the rebellion, 
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, MNLA) 
has been outflanked by an armed Islamist group, Ansar 
Dine (Ançar Eddine), led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a Tuareg chief 
initially sidelined during the discussions that led to the cre-
ation of the MNLA. By taking control of the north, Ansar 
Dine has established a modus vivendi, if not a pact, with 
a range of armed actors, including former regime-backed 
Arab and Tuareg militias and, in particular, al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The latter is responsible for 
kidnappings and killings of many Westerners in Mali, 
Niger and Mauritania, attacks against the armies of the 
region and involved in criminal transborder trafficking. 
Northern Mali could easily become a safe haven for jihadi 
fighters from multiple backgrounds. 
Considered for twenty years a model of democratic pro-
gress in sub-Saharan Africa, Mali is now on the brink of 
sheer dissolution. The prospects of a negotiated solution 
to the crisis are receding with the consolidation of hard-
line Islamist power in the north and a continued political, 
institutional and security vacuum in Bamako. Although 
ECOWAS initially sent out positive signals, the credibility 
of its diplomatic action was seriously compromised by a 
lack of transparency in the attempts at mediation led by 
Burkina Faso, which was bitterly criticised in the Malian 
capital and beyond. Pressure is mounting in favour of an 
external armed intervention as specific security and politi-
cal interests of foreign actors – neighbouring states and 
others – prevail over those of the Malian population in both 
the north and south. 
It would be wise to ignore calls for war and instead to con-
tinue with existing initiatives to promote a political settle-
ment of the conflict, while ensuring that security issues are 
not neglected. ECOWAS countries willing to send troops 
do not appear to fully grasp the complex social situation 
in northern Mali, and underestimate the high risk of inter-
tribal settling of scores that would result from external 
military intervention. Such an intervention would turn Ma-
li into a new front of the “war on terror”, at the expense 
of longstanding political demands in the north, and rule 
out any chance of peaceful coexistence between the dif-
ferent communities. Finally, it would expose West Africa 
to reprisals in the form of terrorist activity to which it is 
not equipped to respond. AQIM’s logistical links with 
southern Libya and northern Nigeria (through Niger) make 
it perfectly feasible for it to carry out terrorist operations 
far from its Malian bases. 
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This series of events in Mali is the result of a weak politi-
cal system despite democratic practices, disillusionment 
in the lack of economic and social development in the north 
and south, government laxity in state management and the 
unprecedented external shock of the Libyan crisis. Under 
the ATT government, relations between the centre of pow-
er in Bamako and the periphery rested on a loose network 
of personal, clientelistic, even mafia-style alliances with 
regional elites with reversible loyalties rather than on ro-
bust democratic institutions. This low-cost system of gov-
ernance was able to contain the actions of the opposition, 
including armed groups, given their limited military ambi-
tions and capacities. It disintegrated when faced with a 
rebellion that was quickly transformed into a well-armed 
group by the effects of the Libyan crisis and the opportun-
ism of Islamist groups that have in recent years accumulat-
ed an abundance of arms using profits from lucrative trans-
Saharan trafficking of illicit goods and Western hostages. 
The perpetuation of a power struggle in Bamako, during a 
transition period whose end is impossible to predict, and 
the confused overlapping of armed groups in the north mean 
the future is very uncertain. A solution to the crisis depends, 
first, on how to restore Mali’s territorial integrity and, se-
cond, on whether the jihadi movements manage to consol-
idate their position of strength in the north. The decisions 
of Mali’s neighbours (Algeria, Niger, Mauritania and Bur-
kina Faso), regional organisations (ECOWAS, African 
Union) and Western and multilateral actors (France, U.S., 
UN, European Union) will also have some influence. It is 
urgent and necessary to restore the political, institutional 
and security foundations of the central state prior to work-
ing towards the north’s reintegration into the republic. It 
is also essential to increase humanitarian aid to the civilian 
population in the Sahel-Sahara region, already facing a 
food crisis, and quickly resume foreign aid to prevent an 
economic collapse. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To ensure security and strengthen the legitimacy  
of transitional institutions and the state  
To the Interim President and the  
Current Prime Minister:  
1. Consolidate the legitimacy of the transitional authori-
ties by urgently forming a genuine government of na-
tional unity after broad consultations with the main 
political parties and civil society organisations. 
2. Ensure the effective establishment of the special unit 
composed of gendarmes and police officers dedicated 
to the protection of transitional institutions represent-
atives and request, if necessary, the deployment of a 
small, external armed contingent to support the force.  
3. Guarantee proceedings of the judicial investigation 
into the assault on 21 May 2012 against the interim 
president, and if progress stalls, request international 
assistance to help identify and punish those who were 
directly and indirectly responsible for the assault. 
To the Malian Defence and Security Forces: 
4. Guarantee the security and free exercise of their duties 
to the prime minister, members of the government and 
the National Assembly and other state officials. 
5. Put an end to arbitrary arrests of civilian and military 
individuals and the settling of scores within the army. 
6. Restructure and restore discipline in the armed forces, 
under the authority of the government and the official 
hierarchy of the different corps.  
To Members of the Former Junta and  
to Leaders of Civil Society Organisations  
that support them: 
7. Stop the manipulation of public opinion through divi-
sive discourses that expose representatives of transi-
tional institutions and politicians in general to violence.  
To Mali’s Bilateral and Multilateral Partners: 
8. Contribute to the reorganisation of the Malian armed 
forces and provide necessary support to the effective 
establishment of a force to protect the transitional 
institutions. 
9. Help stabilise the Malian economy through a rapid 
resumption of foreign aid as soon as a national unity 
government is formed; and answer the urgent human-
itarian needs of the civilian populations severely affect-
ed by the crisis, whether internally displaced persons 
or Malian refugees in neighbouring countries. 
To encourage a political settlement of the conflict  
in the North and neutralise the terrorist threat 
To the Malian Government:  
10. Refrain from launching a military offensive to regain 
control of the north prior to the creation of conditions 
for negotiation with non-terrorist armed actors and 
community representatives, including those forced 
out of the country by violence.  
11. Seek the effective support of neighbouring countries, 
particularly Algeria, for a strategy to regain sover-
eignty over the north and neutralise the terrorist armed 
groups that threaten regional security. 
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To the Leaders of the National Movement for  
the Liberation of Azawad and Ansar Dine: 
12. Formulate publicly clear agendas and commit to: 
a) respecting human rights and the principles of dem-
ocratic and plural governance, especially with regard 
to religion; 
b) guaranteeing security and equal access of the pop-
ulation to basic public services and facilitating the 
access of humanitarian organisations to the popu-
lation;  
c) helping to establish the facts regarding the atroci-
ties at Aguelhoc as well as all other atrocities per-
petrated during the military conquest of the north; 
d) combatting the criminal trafficking activities that 
thrive in the territory they control; 
e) joining immediately the fight against AQIM and 
its armed offshoots; and 
f) exploring with the Malian government how to 
reach a rapprochement to avoid a lasting partition 
of the country and an internecine war. 
To the Governments of Algeria, Mali,  
Niger and Mauritania: 
13. Revive regional cooperation in the fight against ter-
rorism and transborder crime and open up participa-
tion to Nigeria and the Arab Maghreb Union, notably 
Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. 
To the Algerian Government: 
14. End the ambiguity about how serious a threat it be-
lieves armed groups in northern Mali are to regional 
security and show clear support for the restoration, even 
gradual, of Mali’s sovereignty over its entire territory.  
To the Economic Community of West African 
States, the African Union and the UN:  
15. Continue to provide humanitarian support to the ci-
vilian populations who are the direct victims of the 
crisis in the three northern regions as well as to dis-
placed people and refugees.  
16. Adopt a joint strategy, together with the Malian au-
thorities, that combines the establishment of a formal 
framework for negotiations with the armed groups in 
the north, restoration of the Malian armed forces and 
the mobilisation of as many resources as possible, in-
cluding military, to neutralise AQIM and other crim-
inal groups in northern Mali. 
To the UN Security Council: 
17. Support attempts to reach a comprehensive solution 
to the crisis within the framework of Resolution 2056 
of 5 July 2012 by: 
a) providing the Secretary-General’s special represen-
tative in West Africa with the necessary means to use 
his good offices to support ECOWAS mediation;  
b) adopting targeted sanctions against all those who 
are identified as hampering normal operation of the 
transitional institutions in Bamako and attempts 
at resolving the crisis in the north, and against all 
those responsible for serious human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations in the 
north and south; 
c) establishing an independent group of experts to 
investigate the origin of the financial and material 
resources of the armed groups in northern Mali, 
as well as their arms supply lines, and collate in-
formation allowing the identification of Malian and 
foreign persons who should face targeted sanctions; 
and 
d) requesting the creation of an independent UN com-
mission of inquiry into the human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law violations committed 
throughout Malian territory since the beginning 
of the armed rebellion in January 2012, which 
should report to the Security Council as quickly as 
possible.  
To Mali’s Bilateral and Multilateral  
Partners, particularly the European Union, 
France and the U.S.:  
18. Provide political and financial support to Malian po-
litical and social initiatives that seek to resolve the 
crisis by uniting all communities, in the north and the 
south, through promotion of respect for the republic’s 
fundamental principles and society’s traditional reli-
gious tolerance.  
19. Support efforts to reconstitute the defence and secu-
rity forces, with a view to strengthening their cohe-
sion, discipline and effectiveness so they can ensure 
security in the south, constitute a credible threat of last 
resort to protect the populations trapped in the north 
and be capable of participating, if necessary, in re-
gional actions against terrorist groups. 
20. Provide intelligence support to the armed forces of 
Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria to 
help them locate terrorist groups and their arms caches. 




Africa Report N°189 18 July 2012 
MALI: AVOIDING ESCALATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Well before the Libyan crisis, the most attentive observ-
ers were alerted to the danger of the country’s political 
destabilisation by the presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali since 2003, the recurrence of 
localised armed actions by Tuareg and other groups in the 
politically and economically marginalised north of the 
country, and the increasingly dysfunctional nature of the 
Malian state.1 However, neither the sequence of events 
nor the extent and the nature of the crisis that has affected 
the country since January 2012 were predicted accurately. 
The expulsion of central government military forces from 
the north and the collapse of the government in the south 
following the coup led by Captain Sanogo took by sur-
prise not only Malians and the international community but 
also the very instigators of the most spectacular episodes 
of this crisis: the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad (Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad, 
MNLA), which launched an offensive against Malian troops 
in January 2012 and the military junta that carried out the 
coup on 22 March 2012. In their respective spheres, these 
groups have since been overtaken by events caused by 
their actions.  
The MNLA has had to give way to Islamic movements 
that have proved operationally stronger, while the junta’s 
actions provoked a climate of insurrection in Bamako and 
 
1 In March 2005, Crisis Group published a report on Islamism 
and the terrorist risk in the Sahel. Crisis Group decided to con-
duct this research in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, 
when the U.S. launched a security cooperation program with 
the Sahel belt countries with the explicit objective of training 
the armies and security services of these countries for the war 
on terror. The U.S. feared that terrorist Islamist groups seeking 
territories not effectively under the administration of the states 
to which they formally belonged would set up permanent bases 
in the vast Sahara Desert and the surrounding area. The pro-
gram was initially called the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and in-
cluded Chad, Mauritania, Niger and Mali. However, the Crisis 
Group report affirmed that “Mali, a star pupil of 1990s neo-
liberal democratisation, runs the greatest risk of any West Afri-
can country other than Nigeria of violent Islamist activity”. See 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°92, Islamist Terrorism in the Sa-
hel: Fact or Fiction?, 31 March 2005, p. i. 
gave free rein to violent score-settling among politicians 
and within the army. The international community is not 
responding to this situation in a uniform manner and does 
not have local interlocutors who are acceptable and suf-
ficiently legitimate to promote a political resolution of the 
crisis. This leaves the field open to vociferous war-mon-
gering which is unable to offer a constructive long-term 
solution. 
This report is published at a time of evident polarisation 
in the positions held by the multiple actors in this crisis 
and it is proving increasingly difficult for the most mod-
erate to make their voices heard. It provides a detailed 
account of the causes of the decline and implosion of the 
Malian state, maps the strategies and methods of the ac-
tors concerned and assesses the influence of external forces 
on recent Malian political events. Without underestimating 
the extreme danger of some armed groups in the north2 to 
the country and also to the region,3 it outlines how a solu-
tion might be sought to the Malian conflict that would avoid 
a military escalation of the crisis, prevent a long-term war 
and stop the conflict from spreading to the surrounding area. 
 
2 In its 2005 report, Crisis Group established precisely the origin 
and nature of the jihadi terrorist threat in the region. Ibid.  
3 See map of the region in Appendix B. 
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II. THE OBSCURE TWISTS AND TURNS 
OF ATT’S NORTHERN POLICY 
Although the extent and progress of the military rebellion 
launched in northern Mali in January 2012 were to some 
extent a result of the collapse of the Qadhafi regime pro-
voked by the rebellion and NATO strikes,4 the turn of 
events was mainly due to the Malian authorities’ inability 
to govern the north in a way that responded to the securi-
ty, economic and social expectations of its people. These 
unsatisfied aspirations are deeply anchored in the area’s 
history and led to regular cycles of armed uprisings and 
repression throughout the 20th century. Well before the 
Libyan crisis, the government of Amadou Toumani Touré 
(ATT) had aggravated discontent in the north and even fur-
ther afield. The influx of Libyan weapons and the arrival 
of “returnees” – Tuaregs who formerly fought alongside 
Qadhafi and returned to their countries following his de-
mise – precipitated a new rebellion that was fuelled by 
underlying resentment. 
A. TUAREG REBELLIONS, THE NATIONAL 
PACT AND THE ALGIERS ACCORDS 
Political integration of the northern and southern parts of 
Mali’s vast territory is a long and turbulent story, going 
through several evolutions prior to the current climax. The 
most agitated periods of northern Mali’s post-colonial 
history occurred in 1963, the 1990s and 2006-2008. The 
rebellions that took place in these years reflected the pro-
found historical misunderstanding between the elites in 
the north and south at the time of independence in 1960,5 
later entrenched by the south’s marginalisation of the 
 
4 For an analysis of the conflict in Libya and NATO’s military 
campaign, see Crisis Group Middle East and North Africa Re-
port N°107, Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle 
East (V): Making Sense of Libya, 6 June 2011. 
5 See B. Lecocq, “That Desert is Our Country”, doctoral thesis, 
Amsterdam University, 2002. The author describes the political 
perceptions and calculations of the Tuareg elites in Adagh 
(Kidal region) at independence. They banked on the fulfilment 
of the French project to create a Saharan political entity, the 
Organisation of Saharan Regions (Organisation commune des 
régions sahariennes). The Tuareg perceived the abandonment 
of this project and the north’s incorporation into the newly in-
dependent Mali, dominated by the Bambaras, as treason on the 
part of France. In addition to objective factors regarding the 
disconnection between north and south (geographical distance), 
the divide was exacerbated by the reciprocal negative racial ste-
reotyping (Tuareg were “whites, slave owners, lazy” and Sub-
Saharans were “black, unsophisticated and submissive”) that 
infused political discourse and was recycled with each new epi-
sode of political tension. 
north.6 Renewed instability indicates that no definitive 
settlement has been found for these structural problems. 
Each new episode had its own dynamics but was related 
to the previous one.  
For example, the post-conflict period that followed the 
rebellions of the 1990s contained the seeds of the 2006 
uprising just as the current rebellion is partly a result of the 
incomplete settlement of the 2006 crisis. With each conflict, 
memories of unpunished crimes that were not officially 
recognised in the past resurface. Stories of massacres, the 
poisoning of wells and forced exile from 1963, and the 
bloody settling of scores carried out by pro-government 
militias against Tuareg civilians in the 1990s are passed 
down to each new generation of fighters and shape the 
collective memory of a history marked by violence and 
suffering.7 
At the beginning of the 1990s, a rebellion began in northern 
Mali by fighters from a wide range of Tuareg communi-
ties and, to a lesser extent, non-Tuareg communities in 
the region. These fighters were the heirs of two decades of 
activism among exile circles in Algeria and Libya, formed 
by those who had fled from government repression and 
drought in Mali. Some of them had temporarily enrolled 
 
6 See M. Humphreys, and H. Ag Mohamed, “Senegal and Mali”, 
in P. Collier and N. Sambanis, Understanding Civil War. Evi-
dence and Analysis: Africa, World Bank, Washington DC, 2005, 
pp. 247-302. The authors systematically explored the fault lines 
separating north from south and the profound and indisputable 
economic and social differences that manifest themselves in 
broad regional discrepancies in access to education and health. 
These inequalities were mainly inherited from the colonial era, 
when the colonial administration paid little attention to devel-
oping the northern economy, and from the transition towards 
independence, which entrusted the sedentary Bambara elites, 
indoctrinated in socialist ideology, with the task of administer-
ing the culturally and economically distant north, perceived as 
being feudal (see B. Lecocq, “That Desert is Our Country”, op. 
cit.). At the political level, following the 1963 rebellion and un-
til the 1990s, the south kept the north under military control. 
Repression, combined with droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, 
caused the collapse of the nomadic pastoral economy that was 
the heart of Tuareg social organisation and provoked an exodus 
of northern people into neighbouring countries. The north re-
mained a disaster area during the first decades of independence. 
Subsequent development programs did not lessen this margin-
alisation. On the contrary, they were used as political levers by 
restricted groups of beneficiaries, causing jealousies and local 
conflicts (see A. Giuffrida, “Clerics, Rebels and Refugees: Mo-
bility Strategies and Networks among the Kel Antessar”, The 
Journal of North African Studies, vol. 10, no. 3-4 (2005), pp. 
529-543. 
7 B. Lecocq (“That Desert is Our Country”, op. cit.) describes 
the policy of terror conducted by the Malian authorities to de-
feat the 1963 rebellion: the systematic destruction of herds, 
summary executions, forced marriages and other humiliations 
inflicted on civilians as well as rebels.  
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in Colonel Qadhafi’s Islamic Legion8 and served in Leb-
anon and Chad to promote the dictator’s pan-African and 
pan-Arab ambitions. Their experience of exile and coping 
tactics shaped their ishumar9 political culture, which mixed 
socialism and nationalism. 
The 1990 revolution’s initial demands for independence 
were abandoned after pressure from Algeria, which medi-
ated in the conflict,10 and because of the readiness of some 
influential Tuareg chiefs to negotiate. They were represent-
ed by Iyad Ag Ghali,11 who single-handedly conducted a first 
round of negotiations leading to the Tamanrasset Accords 
of 1991.12 These accords provided for a series of measures 
to make the north autonomous and to create a new admin-
istrative division out of the Kidal area, previously admin-
istered by Gao. Gao’s Tuaregs became a minority among 
the sedentary populations of the Niger belt. These accords 
provoked a split between Ag Ghali’s moderate bloc and 
radical supporters of independence. Tribal divisions accen-
tuated ideological disagreements, leading to the creation 
 
8 The Islamic Legion was a pan-African force created by Qadhafi 
at the beginning of the 1970s to combat Western imperialist 
initiatives. It was used in Uganda, Lebanon and especially Chad 
in the early 1980s.  
9 After the French word “chômeur”, meaning unemployed. See 
B. Lecocq, “Unemployed Intellectuals in the Sahara: The Tesh-
umara Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg 
Society”, International Review of Social History, vol. 49 (sup-
plement, 2004), pp. 87-109; and E. Ag Ahar, “L’initiation d’un 
ashamur”, Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 
vol. 57, no.1 (1990), pp. 141-152. 
10 Humphreys and Ag Mohamed, op. cit. 
11 Iyad Ag Ghali was then an achamor (singular of ishumar) 
from Kidal and a member of the Ifoghas clan (the noblest in the 
Tuareg hierarchy) and spoke French. After the Tamanrasset Ac-
cords, he led the Popular Movement of the Azawad (Mouvement 
populaire de l’Azawad, MPA), which later became a counter-
insurgency force in the pocket of the Malian government after 
pro-independence radicals refused a ceasefire and the rebellion 
became an intercommunal struggle. The MPA opposed the Aza-
wad Revolutionary Army (Armée révolutionnaire de l’Azawad, 
ARLA), led by Alaji Gamou, a member of the Imghad tribe, 
subordinate to the Ifoghas in the Tuareg political hierarchy. 
Ironically, Iyad Ag Ghali, now leader of Ansar Dine, and Alaji 
Gamou, who fought the MNLA and Ansar Dine as a colonel in 
the Malian army until March 2012, continue to face each other, 
both of them having switched sides. 
12 Another front signed the Tamanrasset Accords, the Azawad 
Armed Islamic Front (Front islamique armé de l’Azawad, FIAA) 
but some have questioned whether FIAA representatives were 
in fact present when the accords were signed (see B. Lecocq, 
“That Desert is Our Country”, op. cit.). The FIAA was created 
on the initiative of members of the “Berabiche” Arab commu-
nity from Timbuktu. In March 2012, a force that was heir to the 
FIAA temporarily claimed control of Timbuktu, before being 
replaced by Iyad Ag Ghali’s Ansar Dine. It was therefore not 
by chance that Ag Ghali revived this alliance after the fall of 
Timbuktu in March 2012. 
of many diverging Tuareg/northern movements. Although 
divided, the rebellion set up a “coordination”, which ne-
gotiated with the Malian authorities a peace plan that was 
more formal than the Tamanrasset Accords. Known as 
the National Pact, it was the most ambitious of its kind to 
this day.  
Its objective was “a fair and definitive peace in northern 
Mali and national reconciliation”.13 It promised the grad-
ual demilitarisation of the north and the complete integra-
tion of the rebels into special units of the national forces. 
It recognised the north’s economic marginalisation and 
promised a ten-year economic recovery plan to overcome 
the development gap between north and south. The pact 
was accompanied by important constitutional changes that 
transferred a number of state powers to the region and 
opened up opportunities for decentralised international 
cooperation. However, it lacked financial resources and 
its implementation, especially the integration component, 
was continuously postponed.14 In addition, it gave rise to 
violent reaction from a sedentary militia that was dissatis-
fied with the arrangements made for “nomadic” Tuaregs. 
This militia, called Ganda Koy and composed of former 
Malian soldiers, helped to transform the conflict in the north 
into a violent intercommunal and racial conflict, resulting in 
the deaths of dozens of “light-skinned” Tuaregs and Arabs, 
especially in the Gao region, between 1994 and 1996.15  
Non-implementation of the commitments made in the Na-
tional Pact, new periods of drought, and discontent among 
Tuareg soldiers integrated into the Malian army caused a 
resurgence of rebellion in May 2006. Its leaders, Hassan 
Ag Fagaga and Ibrahim Bahanga, both young officers, 
expressed institutional frustrations and denounced dis-
crimination within the army. Their movement, called the 
“23 May Alliance for Democracy and Change”, was this 
time restricted to the Kidal region. Their men were mainly 
Ifoghas from the Popular Movement of Azawad (Mouv-
ement populaire de l’Azawad, MPA), led by Iyad Ag Ghali 
in the 1990s. Ag Ghali became involved and added his 
signature to new accords, again sponsored by Algeria in 
 
13 National Reconciliation Pact, p. 2.  
14 Humphreys and Ag Mohamed, op. cit.; S. Straus, “Mali and 
its Sahelian Neighbors”, “World Development Report 2011, 
Background Case Study”, World Bank, Washington DC, 2011. 
15 The Ganda Koy (“masters of the land”) were mainly Song-
haï, and to a lesser extent, Peul. See B. Lecocq, “That Desert is 
Our Country”, op. cit. and Humphreys and Ag Mohamed, op. 
cit. In 1996, the government officially demobilised the Ganda 
Koy militia and amnestied their members. However, they have 
reformed over the last five years and adopted the name of Gan-
da Izo (“sons of the land”), mainly to counter the emergence of 
armed Tuareg groups. See “New militia group allegedly behind 
murder of four Tuaregs south of Gao”, cable from the U.S. embas-
sy in Bamako, 9 September 2008, as released by  WikiLeaks, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08BAMAKO778.html. 
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July 2006.16 The Algiers Accords revived some provi-
sions of the National Pact, notably the creation of a north-
Malian security force – the Saharan Security Units. The 
Kidal region especially benefited from this agreement, and 
notably the Ifoghas, who were over-represented in the 
monitoring organs created to implement the accords.17 
Once again, there was a delay in implementing the accords 
– notably regarding the creation of the Saharan Security 
Units – and consequently one of the movement’s instiga-
tors, Ibrahim Bahanga, resumed guerrilla warfare against 
Malian troops. He was followed by only a small number 
of supporters but he had the capacity to harm both the 
Malian army and other armed Saharan actors, such as 
traffickers.18 The Bahanga dissidence was temporarily in-
terrupted in 2009. The rebel leader was pressured to make 
his way to Libya, where he was welcomed by Colonel 
Qadhafi. Meanwhile, ATT’s government created an Arab 
militia, led by Abderamane Ould Meydou, and a Tuareg 
militia, led by Alaji Gamou, to conduct counter-insurgency 
operations against Bahanga. The creation of these two mi-
litias followed the same reasoning: invert the local power 
hierarchy by recruiting forces loyal to the Malian state from 
the subordinate communities of the north who were open 
to cooperating with Bamako.  
The Arabs of the Tilemsi Valley, in the region of Gao, Ould 
Meydou’s birthplace, and the Imghads, Gamou’s tribe, 
are respectively dependent on the Kounta and Ifogha com-
 
16 See F. Bouhlel-Hardy, C. Grémont and Y. Guichaoua, Con-
testation armée et recompositions religieuses au Nord-Mali et 
au nord-Niger: perspectives locales, French foreign ministry, 
research unit, 2009, unpublished. In this document, Charles Gré-
mont explains that the non-involvement of other Tuareg com-
munities on the side of the Alliance insurgency was largely due 
to their memories of the internecine struggles between the MPA 
and the ARLA in 1994 and to the latter’s distrust of Iyag Ag 
Ghali, who was co-opted by the Malian authorities during the 
rebellion and became a government agent. 
17 The representatives of the other Kidal communities, notably 
the Idnan and the Taghat Mallet, struggled to reach an under-
standing on the steering committee established for the Algiers 
Accords and were gradually excluded. See “Prominent Tuareg’s 
view of Arab militias, rebellion, and AQIM”, cable from the U.S. 
embassy in Bamako, 18 March 2009, as released by  WikiLeaks, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09BAMAKO163.html. 
18 For more on the career and the circumstances of the tempo-
rary fall of Bahanga, see “Mali using Tuareg militias to combat 
Tuareg rebels”, cable from the U.S. embassy in Bamako, 30 May 
2008, as released by  WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org/cable/ 
2008/05/08BAMAKO482.html#; and “Is the rebellion over? 
Mali beats back Bahanga and prepares for peace in Kidal”, ca-
ble from the U.S. embassy in Bamako, 12 February 2009, re-
vealed by  WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09 
BAMAKO85.html.  
munities.19 The April 2009 local elections confirmed the 
growing influence of the Tilemsi Arabs and the Imghads 
in local politics.20 Although these two groups benefited 
from the government’s formal support, other militias were 
created in the same period, the architecture of which was 
often the same as that of the fronts created in the 1990s: 
the Arab communities of Timbuktu regrouped around the 
former rebels of the Armed Islamic Front of Azawad (Front 
islamique armé de l’Azawad, FIAA) while the Peuls and 
the Songhaïs revived the Ganda Koy, which became the 
Ganda Izo. 
The creation of Arab and Imghad militias and the arms race 
undertaken by other communities reflects ATT’s method 
for governing the north: producing irregular armed actors 
that temporarily neutralise each other, even if, in the words 
of an international official in Bamako, “a rebellion [is to 
break out] every five years”.21 The same reasoning was 
applied to the serious criminal, transborder trafficking 
that was undertaken within both the militia and military 
spheres.22 It appears that the release in January 2012 of 
Ould Awainat, one of the main defendants in a spectacu-
 
19 A useful panorama of the demographic, economic and political 
positions of Arab communities in northern Mali is provided by 
“Berabiche and AQIM in Northern Mali”, cable from the U.S. 
embassy in Bamako, 17 April 2008, as released by  WikiLeaks, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08BAMAKO371.html#. 
20 See “Electoral tensions in Tarkint: Where AQIM, Arab militias, 
and Tuareg meet”, cable from the U.S. embassy in Bamako, 8 
May 2009, as released by  WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org/ 
cable/2009/05/09BAMAKO280.html. 
21 Crisis Group telephone interview, 20 April 2012. 
22 The cables sent by the U.S. embassy in Bamako revealed by  
WikiLeaks give a detailed description of the authorities’ ar-
rangements with the armed groups and traffickers that had in-
fluence on the local political situation in the north. For exam-
ple, see the clemency shown in 2009 towards Amadou Diallo, 
then leader of the Peul and Songhaï defence movement, the 
Ganda Izo, heir of the Ganda Koy. See “Mali releases some 
Tuareg prisoners and one murder suspect prior to local elections”, 
cable from the U.S. embassy in Bamako, 20 April 2009, as re-
leased by  WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09 
BAMAKO246.html. Another example concerns an Arab com-
mander of the Malian army and a former FIAA rebel, Ould Bou 
Lamana, after the interception of a convoy of cocaine in August 
2007. See “Tuareg and Arabs clash over drugs and cash in north-
ern Mali”, cable from the U.S. embassy in Bamako, 31 August 
2007, as released by  WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org/cable/ 
2007/08/07BAMAKO960.html#. Ould Bou Lamana was later 
assassinated at his home in Timbuktu. U.S. administrators have 
many theories about the presumed killers as Lamana was at the 
centre of political, mafia and terrorist networks. “Armed assail-
ants assassinate Col. Lamana Ould Bou in Timbuktu”, cable 
from the U.S. embassy in Bamako, 11 June 2009, as released by  
WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09BAMAKO 
383.html#.  
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lar drug affair (the Air Cocaine affair),23 permitted Colonel 
Ould Meydou to recruit fighters in the Arab community.24 
B. LONG-TERM, DEEPLY-ROOTED 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AQIM IN  
NORTHERN MALI 
The Malian authorities’ reaction to AQIM’s terrorist ac-
tivities followed the same reasoning as their response to 
rebellions and crime in the north. They adopted a low-cost 
policy, in which the north was remotely governed from 
Bamako trying to spare as many state resources as possi-
ble. This could have been seen either as the only option, 
given the state’s limited capacity to deal with militarily 
powerful terrorist groups,25 or as an opportunity for prof-
itable collusion between the interested parties. The first 
hypothesis is weak since Mali does not appear to have 
used the resources provided by France and the U.S. to 
fight terrorism in an optimum way.26 Over the years, the 
 
23 In November 2009, the charred wreckage of a Boeing 727 
emptied of its cargo was discovered in the desert near Tarkint, 
to the north east of Gao. The aircraft had flown from Latin Amer-
ica and, by all accounts, was transporting several dozen tonnes 
of cocaine, no trace of which was found. The aircraft was no 
doubt unable to take off again. As it was not possible to disman-
tle the network of traffickers, the investigation led to the arrest 
of individuals involved in the organisation of the convoy, in-
cluding Ould Awainat, the Malian entrepreneur who was charged 
with building the landing runway for the aircraft and helping to 
unload it.  
24 See “Les brèves du Nord: Neuf colonels capturés par l’équipe 
d’Ould Meïdou”, Maliweb.net, 23 January 2012, http://www. 
maliweb.net/news/la-situation-politique-et-securitaire-au-nord/ 
2012/01/23/article,43316.html.  
25 It is a vision that the U.S. authorities espoused in March 2009. 
While emphasising the difficulties facing the Malian authorities 
in implementing the war against terror, it noted the lack of re-
sources and concluded “that there is no collusion between the 
Malian government and AQMI” (See “Mali’s reality: What mo-
tivates ATT?”, cable of the U.S. embassy in Bamako, 19 March 
2009, as released by  WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks.org/cable/ 
2009/03/09BAMAKO167.html#). It is likely that this view has 
been modified since then. 
26 Since 2002, the U.S. has been continuously involved in moni-
toring and managing the terrorist threat in the Sahel; first through 
the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which became the Trans-Saharan Coun-
terterrorism Initiative in 2005 and was eventually incorporated 
into the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. These di-
verse forms of military cooperation involved providing military 
supplies, anti-terrorism training and large-scale joint military 
exercises. The last of these exercises, which was due to take place 
in February 2012, had to be cancelled because of the outbreak 
of rebellion in the north. The rations supplied for the soldiers 
were eventually parachuted to the Malian soldiers besieged in 
Tessalit (Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Bamako, 19 March 
2012). In recent months, U.S. military and intelligence activity 
has intensified in Africa and focused on the Sahel. See “U.S. 
second hypothesis has seemed increasingly likely and has 
become the dominant doctrine in the foreign affairs de-
partments of Western and neighbouring countries.27 
It is crucial to avoid seeing AQIM as a foreign and autar-
kic organisation that has benefited from the political and 
social vacuum falsely attributed to the Sahara region. It is 
objectively difficult to control the desert but in order to 
survive and flourish on a long-term basis, it is necessary to 
fit into its system of social, economic and political rela-
tions. AQIM’s presence in Mali for around ten years is the 
result of the gradual construction of social arrangements 
at local, national and international levels.  
AQIM is a political and social object, not a pathology. The 
organisation, which used to call itself the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la pré-
dication et le combat, GSPC) before it officially affiliated 
to al-Qaeda in 2007, is a product of the Algerian civil war. 
It is an armed fundamentalist group produced by a split 
among armed Algerian movements and based on a core of 
experienced fighters, some of whom have received mili-
tary training in Afghanistan. The GSPC established itself 
in Mali in 2003 after kidnapping 32 Western tourists in 
southern Algeria. Mali took credit for their release, thanks 
mainly to the mediation of Iyad Ag Ghali. In exchange, 
the hostage takers obtained relative immunity on Malian 
territory (in the Timbuktu region and then, in 2007, the 
Timétrine mountains).28  
Over the years, AQIM has developed social, political and 
economic links29 with the local political institutions and 
charged a toll on transborder traffic.30 Its income was 
boosted in the period starting in 2008 by an increase in 
the number of Westerners kidnapped in this region which 
is important for the tourist industries of both Mali and 
Niger. AQIM’s violent actions were initially concentrated 
outside Mali, in Mauritania and Niger, to the extent that 
neighbouring states and Western partners began to suspect 
the existence of a “non-aggression pact” between Malian 
 
expands secret intelligence operations in Africa”, The Washing-
ton Post, 14 June 2012. 
27 One indication of Western irritation towards the Malian au-
thorities was the vehement speech given by the French ambas-
sador in Bamako at the end of 2011. See “La colère en intégra-
lité d’un ambassadeur atypique: Christian Roux”, Maliweb.net, 
13 December 2011. 
28 “Le sanctuaire quasi-imprenable d’Aqmi dans le Nord du Mali”, 
Jeune Afrique, 21 September 2010; and Crisis Group interview, 
former rebel Tuareg leader, Niamey, 17 March 2012.  
29 Mokhtar Belmokhtar, one of AQIM’s emirs, was married to 
an Arab woman from Timbuktu. 
30 The recent report of an information mission by the French 
National Assembly’s foreign affairs committee provides de-
tailed background on AQIM: “La situation sécuritaire dans les 
pays de la zone sahélienne”, 6 March 2012.  
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forces and the terrorists.31 If such a pact existed, it was no 
longer in place in 2011, when many kidnappings took 
place on Malian territory.32 
The payment of large ransoms has generated a prosperous 
industry that rewards both the terrorist groups and the in-
termediaries responsible for negotiating the release of hos-
tages. At the end of 2010, Algerian diplomats estimated 
that AQIM had received €50 million worth of ransoms 
since 2003.33 Each Western hostage was “worth” around 
€2.5 million – to the countries which agreed to pay up.34 
This industry clearly took on mafia overtones. It involved 
local35 and international actors, notably French.36 While 
paying large sums to terrorists in exchange for the release 
of their hostages, Western foreign affairs departments 
demanded that ATT take a stronger line in the fight against 
AQIM. This has made way for repeated and insistent ne-
 
31 A U.S cable of February 2010 outlined the Algerian ambas-
sador’s extremely virulent opinion about the Malian authorities. 
According to this cable, he told his U.S. counterpart: “The Ma-
lian army had shown capability to take action against the Tua-
reg rebellion but refused to do anything about AQIM. Niger has 
fewer resources but does more in the fight, and the proof is that 
AQIM has been unable to establish a base in that country. It 
looks worse than weakness on the part of the Malians, it looks 
like wilful complicity”. See “New Algerian Ambassador to 
meet with Ambassador”, cable of the U.S. embassy in Bamako, 
19 February 2010, as released by  WikiLeaks, http://wikileaks. 
org/cable/2010/02/10BAMAKO99.html. 
32 Five citizens of Western countries were kidnapped in Hom-
bori on 24 November and another was killed on 25 November 
2011 in Timbuktu. See “Otages du Mali: les derniers touristes 
étrangers évacués de Tombouctou”, Agence France-Presse, 26 
November 2011. 
33 “Terrorist hostage situations: Rescue or ransom?”, Time, 12 
October 2010.  
34 Only the United Kingdom refuses to pay for the release of its 
citizens. 
35 The names that appear most often on the Malian side are 
those of the administrators and paymasters of the Arab militias 
close to the security services, such as Ould Bou Lamana, al-
ready mentioned above. See: “Of Tuareg and terrorists: A re-
bel’s view of unrest in the North and AQIM”, cable of the U.S. 
embassy in Bamako, 21 May 2008, as released by  WikiLeaks, 
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08BAMAKO462.html#. 
36 It was arranged that the French hostage and the two African 
employees working at the Arlit mining complex in Niger and 
kidnapped by AQIM on 15 September 2010 should be released 
without payment. The operation that begun in Niger was neu-
tralised at the last moment by emissaries who hoped to take a 
share of any ransom paid. The release of the hostages only took 
place later and was organised in accordance with the wishes of 
the intermediaries responsible for the cancellation of Niger’s 
initiative. Crisis Group interviews, Tuareg leaders in Niger, 
Niamey, 13 and 16 March 2012. The reason for this sordid epi-
sode was probably competition between French emissaries. See 
“Otages français Niger: rivalités entre négociateurs”, Paris 
Match, 9 November 2011. 
gotiations, but the Malian authorities have emphasised, 
not without reason, that the war is not exclusively theirs and 
insisted they have only very limited military resources.37 
However, Western belief in Bamako’s sincerity gradually 
declined in light of the weakness of the army’s anti-AQIM 
interventions. This mistrust reached its peak at the time of 
the Wagadou forest operation, near the Mauritanian border, 
in June 2011. Leaks from Bamako gave away the Mauri-
tanian and Malian forces’ intention to attack the AQIM 
base located there and the Mauritanian troops, distrustful 
of their Malian counterparts, launched an independent 
offensive on 24 June. The Malian army only participated 
in subsequent operations.38 
C. THE FINAL FAILURE OF ATT’S SECURITY 
POLICY: THE SPECIAL PROGRAM FOR 
PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
NORTHERN MALI 
The final failure of the Malian president’s management of 
the “security and development” situation in the north was 
the Special Program for Peace, Security and Development 
in Northern Mali (Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécu-
rité et le développement au Nord-Mali, PSPSDN). Offi-
cially launched in August 2011, it was allocated around 
€50 million and funded by many bilateral and multilateral 
partners, including France, Canada and the European Union 
(EU). Implementation was focused around new Secure 
Development and Governance Centres39 at eleven strategic 
locations in northern Mali. Security forces were to be sta-
tioned at these centres while infrastructure projects were 
undertaken. The idea was to reaffirm the state’s presence 
in a region from which it had withdrawn. The PSPSDN en-
countered many problems before it was finally suspended 
with the outbreak of rebellion on 17 January 2012. 
An expert on security questions in the north,40 close to the 
case, identified three serious flaws in the project: the de-
sign did not anticipate the local population’s reaction to a 
 
37 Crisis Group telephone interview, French diplomat, 2 April 
2012. WikiLeaks is also a valuable source for information about 
negotiations between Malian authorities and Western partners 
about the war on terror. See: “ATT: ‘We’re Acting On Aqim 
– Now We Need Your Help’”, cable of the U.S. embassy in Ba-
mako, 19 June 2009, as released by  WikiLeaks, http://www. 
cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09BAMAKO401.  
38 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Bamako 24 March 
2012; Crisis Group telephone interview, regional expert, 4 April 
2012. Also see “Le Mali en simple spectateur”, Jeune Afrique, 
6 July 2011.  
39 The following prospectus summarises the project’s main points: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/documents/projects/ 
paix_et_securite_fr.pdf. 
40 Crisis Group telephone interview, 4 April 2012. 
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project establishing a mainly “southern” military presence 
in the north; the institutional arrangements made the pro-
ject controlled completely by the president’s office and 
did not involve the ministries responsible for the security 
forces; and the excessively vertical management structure 
gave too much power to the program manager, Mohamed 
Ag Erlaf.41 As the project got under way, the EU deplored 
the lack of consultation with the local population, which 
had no practical input.  
The fiercest criticism of the PSPSDN came in May 2011 
from the Advocacy Network of Peace, Security and De-
velopment in Northern Mali (Réseau de plaidoyer en faveur 
de la paix, de la sécurité et du développement au Nord-
Mali) in the form of a letter to the EU. Since 2009, this 
organisation, many members of which subsequently joined 
the MNLA, took on the role of a citizens’ lobbying group 
to alert the public to the many ills affecting northern Mali.42 
It received funding from Switzerland and included recog-
nised representatives of the region’s communities. It was 
led by Alghabass Ag Intalla, a deputy for Kidal and suc-
cessor to the amenokal (traditional chief) of the Kel Adagh, 
the highest Tuareg traditional authority in the Kidal region.  
The network’s indictment of the PSPSDN in May 2011 
was damning. It deplored the lack of participation by the 
local population, the scheduling of implementation close 
to presidential elections, the disproportionate allocation of 
resources to security rather than to development and the 
corruption that the project had the potential to generate. 
Finally, it noted the population’s distrust of the military, 
which was seen as a potential nuisance rather than as an 
important contributor to the local economy. The organi-
sation also expressed its surprise at the lack of effort to 
combat “serious crime”. Between October and December 
 
41 Mohamed Ag Erlaf is a Tuareg from Kidal. He proudly pro-
claims his long experience serving the Malian administration, 
including a period as one of ATT’s ministers and as director of 
the National Investment Agency for Local Authorities (Agence 
nationale d’investissements pour les collectivités territoriales). 
His commitment to the Malian state made him a target for Aza-
wad militants, to which he responded that he occupied his post 
on merit rather than the threat of violence. See “Mohamed ag 
Erlaf règle ses comptes: ‘Je ne suis pas un berger à qui on colle 
le grade de Colonel …’ ”, Afribone.com, 19 December 2011, 
http://www.afribone.com/spip.php?article38099. However, he 
could be devious when carrying out his duties: an international 
official thought of him as a “mini-ATT”. Crisis Group tele-
phone interview, 20 April 2012. 
42 See “Manifeste pour la création d’un Réseau de plaidoyer en 
faveur de la paix, de la sécurité et du développement au Nord-
Mali”, Kidal, 3 November 2009.  
2011, a series of armed attacks interrupted work43 at the 
construction sites for the PSPSDN barracks.  
A Bamako-based international official observed that the 
PSPSDN did not cause the rebellion in the north but that 
it undeniably contributed to its escalation.44 The project 
again illustrated the gap between the intentions of donors 
and those of the Malian president. While the former saw 
the PSPSDN as a way of reviving the Algiers Accords and 
even the National Pact, as well as fighting terrorism and 
trafficking, ATT and his government seemed to have 
used it to discard previous accords and replace them with 
a sham attempt to address the new security threats. 
D. FROM THE MNA TO THE MNLA:  
A REBELLION IN THE MAKING 
ATT’s administration of the north was based on collusion 
with local rival and opportunist elites, questionable rela-
tions with AQIM terrorists and the non-transparent and 
imbalanced use of international aid (especially aid pro-
vided for counter-terrorism operations) to strengthen his 
control over the region. The juicy profits deriving from a 
criminal economy, sustained by transborder trafficking 
(especially of drugs) and ransoms from Western hostages, 
explain this “remote control” strategy. These benefits lined 
the pockets of northern and Bamako elites, including sen-
ior officials in the state administration.45 They kept the 
regional economy in a precarious state of underdevelop-
ment. As the regime declined, the international community 
gradually became alienated from the Malian state. 
In the north, the National Movement of Azawad (Mouv-
ement national de l’Azawad, MNA) denounced the situa-
tion before the Libyan crisis erupted in February 2011. 
This political organisation, created in November 2010 by 
Tuareg activists, advocated for self-determination. Its 
leaders, two young students from Timbuktu, Moussa ag 
Acharatoumane and Boubacar Ag Fadil, were arrested in 
November 2010 but released shortly after without charge. 
The MNA was the main source of the MNLA’s platform. 
In a detailed document distributed only to foreign affairs 
departments at the time, the MNA explained why it be-
lieved relations between Azawad and the centre of power 
in Bamako had reached breaking point. The document did 
not emphasise the differences between the northern and 
 
43 According to the authorities, AQIM elements were responsi-
ble. However, Crisis Group interviewees say that, on the con-
trary, local people were responsible, Brussels, 1 March 2012. 
44 Crisis Group telephone interview, 20 April 2012. 
45 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Bamako, 22 March 
2012. Commander Ould Bou Lamana was said to be under the 
direct protection of the director of state security, Mami Cou-
libaly. See “Of Tuareg and terrorists”, cable of the U.S. embas-
sy in Bamako, op. cit. 
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southern ways of life and cultures; neither did it celebrate a 
glorious indigenous past in the classic manner of nationalist 
movements seeking to reinvent identities or “re-tradition-
alise” society.46 
On the contrary, the document focused on the origins of 
what it described as the gradual and irreversible erosion 
of trust between northern communities and the central 
government. It highlights several causes for this: economic 
marginalisation of the north, brutalisation of the popula-
tion by the security forces, failure to comply with commit-
ments made in the various peace agreements, the govern-
ment’s lax approach to AQIM and drug traffickers, and 
corrupt use of international aid provided for the north. An 
account of these grievances was followed by an appeal to 
the international community to recognise Azawad as a 
legitimate entity. Although it is difficult to assess precisely 
the popularity of the MNA’s discourse among the north-
ern population, it broadly reflects ideas put forward during 
formal civil society meetings in the region, such as those 
organised by the very extensive Advocacy Network for 
Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali. At the 
end of 2010, there was fierce discontent among northern 
representatives towards the government. The Libyan crisis 
precipitated the network’s transformation into a rebellion. 
 
46 Such an anthropological and historical approach would be 
something of a challenge given that Azawad, as defined by the 
MNA, extends as far as north of Mopti and is demarcated by 
the Malian borders, despite the close links between the Malian 
Tuaregs and their otherwise culturally diverse counterparts in 
Niger, Algeria, Libya and Burkina Faso. In addition to the Tua-
reg populations, “Azawad” includes Arab, Peul and Songhaï 
peoples. This diversity was recognised by the MNA (and later 
the MNLA). Its project was explicitly inclusive and reflected 
above all a desire to be rid of southern control. The political use 
of the term “Azawad” by Tuareg nationalists dates back to 1976. 
See B. Lecocq, “That Desert is Our Country”, op. cit. 
III. NOW OR NEVER? THE RESURGENCE 
OF THE REBELLION  
The resurgence of the rebellion in the north on 17 January 
2012 and the coup of 21 March 2012 in Bamako could be 
seen as the latest elements in the wave of regional desta-
bilisation that began with the conflict in Libya and inter-
national military intervention. A policy of regime change 
quickly replaced the notion of responsibility to protect, 
on which NATO’s action was theoretically based, without 
arrangements for ensuring the population’s security, much 
less for maintaining control over the circulation of arms.47 
Despite the embargo on flows in and out of Libya,48 there 
was a massive transfer of Libyan arms across the Sahel 
belt.49 A French diplomat confided that “those who took 
the decision to bombard did not have the least idea of the 
consequences it could have for the south”.50 The uncon-
trolled sequence of events gives credence to this view. 
A. THE LIBYAN FACTOR: QADHAFI  
AND NORTHERN MALI 
Although Colonel Qadhafi was far from exercising region-
al hegemony – Algeria is another major regional power51 
– he was able to influence irregular armed initiatives, par-
ticularly by Tuaregs in northern Mali and northern Niger. 
He facilitated rapprochements between these rebellions 
and the central governments of the countries concerned and 
controlled the calendar of political arrangements thanks to 
his financial resources. The other tool he used many times 
was the “integration” in the ranks of his army of Malian 
and Niger Tuareg elements that were most likely to cause 
turmoil in their country of origin.52 This approach, far from 
being philanthropic, served interests that were understood 
very well by the various parties involved. Qadhafi’s policy 
 
47 See Crisis Group Report, Popular Protest in North Africa 
and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya, op. cit.  
48 See paragraph 5 of UN Security Council Resolution 2017 of 
31 October 2011 on Libya. 
49 “Final Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to 
Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya”, 
UN Security Council, 2012. 
50 Crisis Group interview, Paris, 9 March 2012. 
51 Another regional power is Morocco. Although surpassed in 
economic importance by Libya and Algeria, two major oil-pro-
ducing countries, Morocco has a well-organised state administra-
tion and army that ensure political stability, despite the turmoil 
in North Africa. However, Morocco, which is farther from Mali, 
has historically had little influence over that country. Its rela-
tions with Libya and Algeria remain strained by the issue of 
Western Sahara.  
52 See Crisis Group Report, Popular Protest in North Africa 
and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya, op. cit., p. 23.  
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followed the same course in other countries south of the 
Sahara, for example, in Chad.53  
Qadhafi established lasting ties of allegiance in the Sahel 
while he enlisted fighters in his Islamic Legion and spe-
cial units for his own military designs (for example, in 
Chad and Lebanon in the 1980s). The Tuareg combatants 
he recruited sought support for their own “revolution” in 
their country of origin; but this hope was never satisfied and 
the Niger and Mali rebellions in the 1990s were launched 
with equipment that had been patiently stockpiled rather 
than gratefully contributed by the Qadhafi regime.  
Meanwhile, the states helped by Libya avoided having to 
make costly provisions for resolving armed conflicts in 
their outlying territories. Libyan patronage was not restrict-
ed to Saharan populations, far from it. Niger and Mali ben-
efited massively from the generosity of Qadhafi, who, after 
the failure of his pan-Arab initiatives, refocused his eco-
nomic cooperation and diplomatic efforts on sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1990s. In addition to Libyan investments in 
Africa, flows of economic migrants in the opposite direc-
tion increased, resulting from drought and the collapse of 
the pastoral economy in the southern Sahara. The links that 
developed between Qadhafi’s Libya and the populations 
of northern Mali and northern Niger were therefore based 
on family and friendship ties as well as security consider-
ations. It was in Libya (and Algeria) that the rich ishumar 
(unemployed exiles) protest culture was developed, which 
infused and unified54 the rebel Tuareg projects in the 1990s.55 
Qaddafi’s overthrow not only deprived the region of one 
of its main political brokers and patrons, it also put on the 
market quantities of heavy arms that were redistributed in 
the region according to local demands and aspirations. It 
also compelled men who were no longer welcome to seek 
exile outside Libya, including those who supplied the 
MNLA with their military equipment and expertise, start-
ing with Mohamed Ag Najim, its current military leader, a 
Malian Tuareg from Adagh whose father was killed in the 
1963 repression. He belonged to Qadhafi’s Malian “fun-
damentalist” cohort, whose members were allowed to stay 
in Libya for a long period and were even granted Libyan 
nationality. These exiles lived in Libya from the end of 
the 1970s, were used by Qadhafi for his military adven-
tures in Lebanon and Chad and participated in the Tuareg 
rebellions in Mali in the 1990s. Ag Najim later returned 
 
53 See Crisis Group Africa Report N°180, Africa without Qad-
dafi: The Case of Chad, 21 October 2011.  
54 B. Lecocq, “Unemployed Intellectuals in the Sahara”, op. cit. 
55 For more on the “services” provided to Qadhafi by the Tua-
regs, also see Frédéric Deycard and Yvan Guichaoua, “‘Wheth-
er you liked him or not, Gadaffi used to fix a lot of holes’ – 
Tuareg insurgencies in Mali and Niger and the war in Libya”, 
AfricanArguments.org, 8 September 2011.  
to serve under Qadhafi as a senior officer of units sta-
tioned at Sebha, in the south, until the regime collapsed.56 
Qadhafi had positioned forces mainly of Malian Tuareg 
origin and, to a lesser extent, Nigerien, in the Fezzan, in 
Libya’s south west. They quickly realised it was best to 
leave the country as soon as NATO declared its support 
for the National Transitional Council (NTC), the Libyan 
rebels’ organ. Although these forces initially helped the 
Qadhafi war effort, they soon swelled the ranks of the “re-
turnees” on the Malian side of the border. In addition to 
Malian and Niger fighters already based in Libya, a few 
hundred young Tuareg fighters came directly from north-
ern Mali and northern Niger to join the loyalist forces on a 
paid basis.57 Their experience as mercenaries did not last 
long and was often bitter.58 Finally, Qadhafi’s fall released 
another important leader of northern Mali’s tumultuous 
political life, Ibrahim Bahanga, who, before his death in 
August 2011 (officially in a car accident), was the key agent 
in rebuilding a rebel Tuareg armed force, acting as an in-
termediary between the different groups and organising 
the supply of arms.59 
Intense arms circulation resulted from the movement of 
combatants in the Libyan, Nigerien and Malian deserts. 
Reports on the transfer of Libyan arms to Mali are incon-
sistent. During the summer of 2011, Western security ex-
perts voiced their concern about the possible circulation 
of “man-pads”, portable missile launchers able to strike 
against aircraft. To this day, the use of such weapons in the 
Sahara has not been detected but there are repeated rumours 
of their presence.60 Moreover, several security sources 
signalled the presence of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an AQIM 
emir, in southern Libya at the start of 2012, on a mission 
to establish alliances and/or to place orders for military 
equipment.61 The arms transported to Mali are reportedly 
mainly light arms and ammunition,62 but in June 2011, the 
 
56 For a brief biography of Ag Najim, see “Rébellion du MNLA 
au Mali: Ag Najem, ou la soif de vengeance”, Jeune Afrique, 
27 January 2012.  
57 See “Des centaines de Touareg maliens et nigériens recrutés 
par Kadhafi (élus)”, Jeune Afrique, 2 March 2011; and “Libyan 
oil buys allies for Qaddafi”, The New York Times, 15 March 2010. 
58 See “Libya: témoignages de ‘mercenaires’ touaregs de Kad-
dafi rentrés au Niger”, Jeune Afrique, 4 September 2011. 
59 Crisis Group interview, regional expert, Brussels, 1 March 2012. 
60 However, there are technical difficulties associated with the 
use of this equipment and training is required. See “Libyan 
missiles on the loose”, The Washington Post, 9 May 2012. 
61 Crisis Group interview, Niamey, 13 March 2012; and “Mali: 
comment sauver le nord ?”, Jeune Afrique, 9 May 2012.  
62 An MNLA commander recalled 600 vehicles were involved 
in transporting these arms. They were mainly AK-47s and 12.7 
mm machine-guns. See “‘Nous devons resserrer les rangs et 
éviter toute confrontation qui diviserait le mouvement’”, El 
Watan, 9 April 2012.  
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Nigerien authorities intercepted a convoy transporting 
several hundred kilograms of explosives. Abta Hamidine, 
the trafficker arrested on that occasion, said that AQIM 
was due to take delivery of them in Mali.63 
The Libyan, Nigerien and Malian authorities seem only to 
have been able to curb this trafficking sporadically. In 
Mali, which does not have a border with Libya, the mas-
sive influx of arms from Libya raised suspicions about 
Niger, through which the arms are likely to have been 
transported.64 Porous borders, Nigerien military weakness 
and practical difficulties in patrolling thousands of kilo-
metres of desert have facilitated this circulation.65 These 
constraints remain, even when the authorities receive in-
formation from satellite surveillance (notably from France).66 
In addition, it was not easy to disarm the “returnees” as 
they arrived in Mali, because they had first hidden their 
arms.67 Only the Qadhafi dignitaries who arrived in Niger 
in September 2011 were officially disarmed. Finally, the 
heaviest arms currently deployed by the MNLA68 were 
seized not in Libya but in Mali, notably at the battle for 
Tessalit, at the beginning of March 2012.  
B. THE RISE OF THE MNLA 
The MNLA launched its first attack on 17 January 2012, 
nearly six months after the arrival of the “returnees”, 
during which time many long consultations took place 
between the communities in northern Mali, especially in 
Zakak, near the Algerian border. These discussions mobi-
lised the participants around the plan for an armed upris-
ing. They did not however take place secretly. Many Mali-
an government envoys, Tuareg dignitaries loyal to Bamako 
 
63 United Nations Security Council, 2012, op. cit., p. 29; and 
“Reportage exclusif: Abta Hamidine s’apprêtait à livrer les 
quatre otages français au clan Khadafi”, Aïr Info, 29 June 2011.  
64 An anecdote conveys the reciprocal distrust between the 
leaders of the two countries. A senior Nigerien diplomat re-
counts how he was questioned by his Malian counterpart at an 
official meeting: “Why did you allow arms to be transported in 
that way?” To which the Nigerien diplomat replied, in an allu-
sion to the Air Cocaine affair: “Why did you allow a cargo 
plane to land in your desert?” Crisis Group interview, Niamey, 
20 March 2012. 
65 Illegal transborder traffic is the subject of informal arrange-
ments between traffickers and state officials responsible for 
border surveillance. Crisis Group interviews, regional experts, 
Niamey, 16 March 2012, and Crisis Group telephone inter-
views, regional experts, 16 April 2012. 
66 Crisis Group telephone interview, French military specialist, 
2 April 2012. 
67 Crisis Group interview, former Tuareg rebel leader, Niamey, 
17 March 2012. 
68 Armoured vehicles and anti-aircraft guns, which can be seen 
in this Al Jazeera report from Timbuktu: http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=i5q7PW0B3L0&feature=youtu.be. 
and parliamentarians tried to open negotiations, but in 
vain. The refusal to enter into dialogue at this stage of the 
rebel project expressed both the mistrust of the future 
fighters towards the government69 and the radical separatist 
ideas that had been consolidated by the Libyan windfall and 
that could be summarised in the slogan: “now or never”.70  
The theory that Malian forces stationed in the north were 
surprised by a sudden, heavily-armed revolt71 does not hold 
water. Since September 2011, and amid tensions provoked 
by the president’s “security and development” program, 
the Bamako press had been reporting on the resurgence of 
“security problems in the north” and the situation of the 
“returnees” from Libya. The MNLA was officially created 
in October 2011. A former leading rebel known as “Bam-
oussa” deserted from the Malian army in November72 and 
a Mauritanian website reported that Iyad Ag Ghali had 
returned to the bush in December. 
The armed mobilisation that produced the MNLA was the 
product of circumstantial alliances between a range of ac-
tors who were ready to take up arms rather than the result 
of a process of recruitment of fighters by a vertically struc-
tured organisation.73 This model involved the absence of 
clear and definitive demarcation lines between fighting units. 
Moreover, the military strategies adopted were the prod-
uct of internal compromises and negotiations rather than 
direct orders from senior officers. The risk of division, if 
not disintegration, was high if those within the insurrec-
tion started to make calculations as to whether they had 
more to gain from leaving rather than staying. The divi-
sion of the 1990s rebellion into many “fronts” (when 
some laid down their arms and were rewarded in return, 
 
69 At the end of January, Jeune Afrique revealed the final Mali 
government proposals to the rebels, communicated by Mohamed 
Ag Erlaf, manager of the PSPSDN, at a meeting in Zakak on 7 
January. They were based on the usual method of offering tar-
geted favours, which was precisely one of the major root causes 
of the insurrection then underway. “Mali: ce que Bamako pro-
posait au MNLA avant la rébellion”, Jeune Afrique, 31 January 
2012.  
70 Crisis Group interview, Mossa Ag Attaher, MNLA commu-
nications officer, Paris, 28 January 2012. 
71 Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Pourquoi personne n’a rien vu venir”, Le 
Nouvel Observateur, no. 2475, 2012, pp. 66-67. 
72 See “Après l’enlèvement et la mort de touristes occidentaux 
au Nord Mali …”, Maliweb.net, 30 November 2011, http://www. 
maliweb.net/news/la-situation-politique-et-securitaire-au-nord/ 
2011/11/30/article,36985.html. 
73 This phenomenon is characteristic of the Sahel belt. Y. 
Guichaoua, “Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in 
Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg Insurgency in Northern 
Niger (2007-2009)” in Guichaoua, Y. (eds.), Understanding 
Collective Political Violence (Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 246-266; 
M. Debos, “Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian 
combatants in the Central African Republic”, African Affairs 
(2008), vol. 107, no. 427, pp. 225-241. 
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while others carried on fighting with the aim of becoming 
essential interlocutors during negotiations) was a result of 
the rapid adjustments made in time of war. A variant of 
this scenario seems to be underway in the summer of 2012, 
with Ansar Dine attracting MNLA fighters over to its side.  
The MNLA is a coalition of various groups. Its military 
power and expertise mainly come from Ag Najim and his 
fellow returnees from Libya,74 while its political leadership 
is dominated by relatives of Ibrahim Bahanga. Before his 
death, the latter not only established contacts between Ag 
Najim and his followers, he also forged an alliance with 
young MNA militants who spent months secretly travel-
ling around the countryside to promote their ideas. Desert-
ers from the Libyan army then joined the MNLA, which 
benefited, if not from the official support, then at least from 
the good wishes of Alghabas Ag Intalla, president of the 
Advocacy Network mentioned above.75  
Finally, the MNLA has active political contacts and lead-
ers outside Mali, in Mauritania, Burkina Faso and France. 
For example, the former student activist Mossa Ag Attaher, 
from Gao, and Hama Ag Sid’Ahmed, an elected repre-
sentative in northern Mali and father-in-law of the late 
Bahanga and his spokesman during the different rebel-
lions, have a high profile in Paris. Their activities are dis-
seminated through the dynamic “toumastpress” website, 
which is censored in Mali (as is also the Kidal Info web-
site). Algerian Kabyle nationalists who defend the com-
mon identity of the Berber peoples, which historically in-
cludes the Tuaregs, are among those who provide logistical 
support for pro-MNLA activism in Paris.76 Moreover, the 
MNLA has been able to organise some communications 
operations in Europe with the support of regionalist move-
ments, without, however, achieving the same level of suc-
cess as the Nigerien Movement for Justice (Mouvement 
des Nigériens pour la justice, MNJ) in 2008.77 
 
74 Unconfirmed reports mentioned 400 men, many of whom 
grew up in Libya and had only a vague knowledge of Mali. 
Crisis Group interview, former Tuareg rebel leader, Niamey, 17 
March 2012.  
75 Crisis Group interview, international official, Bamako, 20 
March 2012. 
76 The most active Berber movement communications organ is 
the website www.tamazgha.fr. The Kabyle movement, whose 
propaganda normally aims at Algeria, allows Mossag Ag At-
taher, one of the MNLA’s Paris representatives, to produce a 
weekly video on the situation in northern Mali, which is posted 
on the website of the “press agency of the Tamasheq (Tuareg) 
people”, toumastpress.com. 
77 The Tuareg rebels in the MNJ managed to mobilise a signifi-
cant number of anti-globalisation organisations and parties: the 
Greens, Survie, the Danielle Mitterrand Foundation, the MRAP, 
the Anti-Nuclear Network (Réseau Sortir du nucléaire), etc., 
which had actively disseminated rebel propaganda (See Gui-
Bamako quickly perceived the MNLA’s explicitly pro-
Western stance as de facto collusion with the former co-
lonial power. Supporters of the junta among others, buy 
into this theory. It was encouraged by the premature state-
ments in favour of a political solution to the conflict made 
by the then French foreign minister, Alain Juppé.78 Mean-
while, public opinion in Bamako was shocked by the suc-
cessive military defeats in the north. The French authorities 
certainly saw the MNLA as a legitimate negotiating part-
ner and even a potential ally in the “war on terror”, given 
the passive attitude of the Malian security forces towards 
AQIM.79 The option of using the Tuaregs, who know the 
terrain, against AQIM was in any case discussed in French 
circles even before the rebellion broke out in January 2012.80  
This benevolence in principle has not, however, translat-
ed into logistical support. Reluctance about promoting an 
explicitly separatist project, the absence of a clear MNLA 
program and leadership and the fluid nature of the loyal-
ties of its organisers are all obstacles to a rapprochement 
with the French authorities.81 Mauritania, a major regional 
ally of France, welcomed the MNLA, and according to a 
country specialist, is favourable to the movement’s plan to 
expel AQIM from northern Mali.82 It is impossible to say 
whether this rhetorical support has translated into effec-
tive logistical aid.  
In the field, the MNLA’s sociological profile is broad and 
plural. The movement is composed of representatives of 
most Tuareg communities in northern Mali, including from 
Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, its domination by 
recalcitrants from the Algiers Accords (close associates of 
Bahanga) and those who had been gradually sidelined by 
the agreement (members of the Idnans, Ag Najim’s tribe) 
indicated a shift in the rebellion’s centre of political gravity 
at the expense of the person who took the lead in settling 
the 2006 rebellion, Iyad Ag Ghali. The MNLA rejects the 
authority of both the central government and those in the 
north who have compromised with Bamako, such as Ag 
Ghali. However, in its opposition to Ag Ghali, who remains 
an important figure in the Tuareg community, the MNLA 
adopts a different, softer tone than that which it uses 
against the Malian state, which it sees as a coloniser.  
 
chaoua, op. cit.). The MNLA has not benefited from any com-
parable wave of sympathy. 
78 “Au Mali, Alain Juppé appelle au dialogue avec les rebelles”, 
Radio France Internationale (RFI), 27 February 2012. 
79 Crisis Group interviews, senior French officials, Paris, 24 
April 2012. 
80 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Paris, October 2011. 
81 Crisis Group interviews, senior French officials, Paris, 24 
April 2012. 
82 Crisis Group telephone interview, 4 April 2012.  
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C. IYAD AG GHALI’S THWARTED PERSONAL 
AMBITIONS AND THE ISLAMIST AGENDA  
Iyad Ag Ghali attended the consultations organised before 
the rebellion was launched. He even asked to be appointed 
the movement’s secretary general, which was refused.83 
He also indicated he was against an armed struggle unless 
it was to impose Sharia law throughout Mali and he explic-
itly rejected the MNLA’s separatist project.84 The central 
role he maintained in the Tuareg political order, especially 
in Kidal, nevertheless required him to take up a position 
vis-à-vis the emerging actors of the MNLA or to find a way 
of supplanting them.85 Indisputably a key figure in Tuareg 
politics, he made a change in religious direction in the 
1990s and his new beliefs have only grown stronger with 
time. He joined Jamaat ut-Tabligh, a missionary movement 
of Indian origin introduced to Mali in the mid-1990s. This 
movement preaches a rigorous Islamic faith of personal 
redemption, has no political vocation and even condemns 
jihad.86 
The attitudes of the various Tuareg tribes to Islam diverge 
and shape their identity. Although the tabligh is a current 
of Islam imported to northern Mali, the religious inclina-
tions of the Ifoghas, Iyad Ag Ghali’s tribe, are rooted in 
their local history. In addition, Ag Ghali’s adherence to a 
more rigorous form of Islam is a choice many in Mali and 
 
83 Iyad Ag Ghali was also hoping to be chosen as the successor 
to the traditional leader of the Ifoghas (amenokal), a role that 
was also refused him. Alghabass Ag Intallah, one of Intallah 
Ag Attaher’s sons, was chosen instead and is the current ame-
nokal. In the space of a few weeks, Iyad Ag Ghali therefore en-
dured two humiliating defeats in northern Mali’s Tuareg politi-
cal life. Crisis Group telephone interview, 10 May 2012. 
84 See “Iyad Ag Ghali: ‘Ansar dine ne connaît que le Mali et la 
charia’”, Jeune Afrique, 8 April 2012. Iyad Ag Ghali seemed 
ready to abandon his anti-separatist position when Ansar Dine 
and MNLA discussed merging at the end of May. Following 
the failure of his plans, he has apparently returned to his initial 
point of view. “Interview-Mali Islamist leader rejects independ-
ence”, Reuters, 16 June 2012. 
85 According to an MNLA representative, this strategic calcula-
tion is coupled with Iyad Ag Ghali’s absolute detestation of an-
yone who challenges his power. Crisis Group interview, Paris, 
29 June 2012. 
86 He converted to Jamaat ut-Tabligh and spent six months in a 
tablighi retreat in Pakistan. His position became more radical 
during an official stay in Saudi Arabia as a Malian diplomat 
after the Algiers Peace Accords in 2006. For more on the Tab-
ligh in Mali, see Bouhlel-Hardy, Grémont, and Guichaoua, “Con-
testation armée et recompositions religieuses au Nord-Mali et 
au nord-Niger”, op. cit.; Crisis Group Report, Islamist Terror-
ism in the Sahel, op. cit.; and cable from the U.S. embassy in 
Bamako on the Tabligh’s relative success in northern Mali, as 
released by  WikiLeaks, “Dawa meeting in Kidal not much to 
talk about”, 21 December 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/ 
12/09BAMAKO822.html.  
West Africa made, possibly in response to the extent of 
government corruption and the region’s many economic 
and social problems. It would therefore be a mistake to 
deny any social legitimacy to the project to impose Sharia 
law embodied by Iyad Ag Ghali. Moreover, according to 
the academic Ferdaous Bouhlel, there is a wide variety of 
interpretations of Sharia in the north and it could there-
fore be the subject of negotiations.87 Finally, it is danger-
ous to see the renewal of religious aspirations as a prelude 
to jihad, which involves violent methods of socialisation 
and distinct personal trajectories.  
It nevertheless remains true that Iyad Ag Ghali’s funda-
mentalist project – which echoes aspirations expressed in 
the south – is fiercely opposed by those Tuaregs who prac-
tise a tolerant Islam, respect the important role given to 
women in the social order88 and celebrate the liberal ethos 
of the exiles (ishumar) and their artistic, especially musi-
cal, modes of expression.89 The current divide between 
Ansar Dine (“the supporters of religion”) and the MNLA 
manifests itself not only as rivalry in the struggle for 
power in the north but also in their different visions for 
society, which go beyond the strictly political framework. 
The discrediting of Iyad Ag Ghali during the preparatory 
work for constructing the MNLA was indirectly aimed at 
the Algerian authorities, sponsors of the 2006 Accords pro-
duced with Ag Ghali. In an interview with Crisis Group 
in March 2012, Mossa Ag Attaher emphasised that the 
Algiers Accords focused almost solely on the Kidal re-
gion while the MNLA unites the three regions of northern 
Mali and has a clearly more ambitious project than the 
one finally validated by the Accords.90 The resumption of 
the rebellion signalled the obsolescence of the political 
arrangement established six years previously under Alge-
rian auspices and could be seen as a disavowal of its Alge-
rian and Malian authors. When Algeria invited the rebels 
to Algiers, on 2-4 February, two weeks after the outbreak 
of hostilities, the only person to accept the invitation was 
Hamada Ag Bibi, a representative of the 23 May Alliance 
 
87 Crisis Group telephone interview, 22 May 2012. 
88 In February 2012, the independent journalist Andy Morgan 
collected testimony that showed the anger of Tuareg women 
following Ag Ghali’s pro-Sharia speech at the discussions that 
took place prior to the rebellion. See “The causes of the uprising 
in northern Mali”, Think Africa Press, 6 February 2012, http:// 
thinkafricapress.com/mali/causes-uprising-northern-mali-tuareg.  
89 The “desert blues”, played by groups that are having increas-
ing international success (Tinariwen, Terakaft, Tamikrest, Am-
anar to mention only Malian artists), is a powerful vector of 
ishumar counter-culture and a major cultural reference with 
values that are not compatible with Salafi Islamism. 
90 Crisis Group interview, Mossa Ag Attaher, Paris, 5 March 
2012. 
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for Democracy and Change, previously discredited by the 
MNLA.91 
The MNLA was opposed to Algerian mediation from the 
start.92 After the movement began its military offensive, 
Algeria refused, according to the rebels, to allow wounded 
fighters to seek refuge in its territory, thereby showing a 
cold relationship between the MNLA and Algeria. The 
episode provoked a virulent reaction on the propaganda 
website toumastpress.93 The MNLA’s opening of a politi-
cal office in Nouakchott, Mauritania, a major regional ally 
of France, and the appearance of MNLA contacts at the 
side of Algerian Berber activists in Paris were two addi-
tional reasons for the increasingly tense relations between 
the Algerian authorities and the Tuareg movement. In 
more general terms, Algeria is worried about the deploy-
ment of an armed force that is not under its control very 
close to its southern border, all the more so as this force is 
suspected of benefiting from French good-will. The MNLA 
seems, however, to have softened its position towards Alge-
ria in its most recent statements.94 
 
91 See “Rébellion touareg: retour à la case Alger”, El Watan, 3 
February 2012; and Crisis Group interviews, Bamako, 30 May 
2012.  
92 Crisis Group interviews, MNLA representatives, Paris, 23 
January 2012. 
93 “L’Algérie partiale viole la Convention de Genève”, tou-
mastpress, 25 January 2012, http://toumastpress.com/actualites/ 
liberation-azawad/230-lalgerie-partiale-viole-la-convention-de-
geneve.html. 
94 Mélanie Matarese, “Mossa Ag Attaher: ‘L’Algérie est incon-
tournable dans la gestion de notre conflit’, “Visa pour l’Algérie”, 
blog published by Le Figaro, 14 April 2012, http://blog.lefigaro. 
fr/algerie/2012/04/mossa-ag-attaher-lalgerie-est-incontournable-
dans-la-gestion-de-notre-conflit.html.  
IV. THE FRAGMENTED AND  
VOLATILE DYNAMICS OF  
THE REBEL MOVEMENT  
There is growing confusion about the armed actors that 
have been present in northern Mali since January 2012. As 
described above, this is the result of the constant estab-
lishment and breaking of alliances between experienced 
fighters in accordance with ever-changing circumstances. 
The war was conducted in equal measure by strategic mili-
tary movements and diplomatic manoeuvres involving rap-
prochement, or the exact opposite, between the belligerent 
forces. These practices minimised, but did not eliminate, 
the frequency and intensity of violent clashes between re-
bel groups and Malian forces. Between 17 January and 
the end of March, discussions between the armed actors 
in the field preceded each territorial conquest.95 The con-
ventions of warfare seem to have been respected, with the 
notable exception of the grave events at Aguelhoc, which 
should be investigated. 
A. THE LIGHTNING MILITARY CAMPAIGN 
CONDUCTED BY THE ARMED GROUPS IN 
THE NORTH 
The rebel military campaign was very quick. The turning 
point was the battle of Amachach/Tessalit, in February 
and March 2012. Several hundred Malian soldiers were 
stationed at this base, which was essential to the govern-
ment’s security arrangements in the north and possessed 
an airport. The rebels surrounded and besieged the base 
and, despite using combat helicopters, the Malian army was 
unable to resupply it. On 10 March, the rebels took control 
of the base after negotiating the evacuation of its occu-
pants to Gao. The towns of Menaka, Aguelhoc, Léré and 
Tinzaouatène had already been attacked and “conquered”. 
After Tessalit and ATT’s overthrow, the rebels took con-
trol of Kidal, Gao (where the army headquarters in charge 
of counter-insurgency operations was located) and Tim-
buktu. The rebel military advance ended with the MNLA’s 
proclamation of the independence of Azawad on 5 April 
2012.96 
The government forces on duty in the north were the 
Imghad and Arab “militias”, commanded by Colonels Alaji 
Gamou and Abderamane Ould Meydou respectively. These 
militias formed part of the Malian army and recruited 
troops from within their own communities. They were 
 
95 Crisis Group interview, former Tuareg rebel leader, Niamey, 
17 March 2012. 
96 Some Malians interpreted the broadcast of this declaration by 
the French television channel on international affairs, France 
24, as an indication of France’s support for the MNLA project. 
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flanked by regular soldiers from the south. Expecting the 
militias to rally to its side, the MNLA carefully spared 
Gamou and its propaganda went so far as to praise the 
bravery of his fighters. On 31 March, defeated at Kidal, 
Gamou announced on RFI97 that he would join the rebels, 
before reappearing a few days later in Niamey to say that 
it was nothing more than a manoeuvre designed to protect 
his retreat and especially that of the “southerners” among 
the ranks of his units. He and his men then stationed them-
selves in Niger.98 Although the colonel initially indicated 
that they were again available to the Malian army,99 he 
went on to open his own “front”, called the Republican 
Movement for the Restoration of Azawad (Mouvement 
républicain pour la restauration de l’Azawad, MRRA), 
undoubtedly in an attempt to increase his personal influ-
ence over the course of events.100 
Gamou’s Arab counterpart, Abderamane Ould Meydou, 
has apparently adopted similar tactics by creating a force 
in Mauritania.101 The number of men under his command 
is unknown. However, on the assumption that they receive 
external support and that Gamou manages to put together 
an operational military force in Niger, the military come-
back of the two colonels presents the risk of further frag-
mentation of an already complex conflict into a series of 
micro-conflicts driven by private interests. 
The rebels’ military modus operandi, characterised by har-
assment of the enemy followed by retreat to difficult ter-
rain, is similar to that of previous rebellions. This time, it 
involved simultaneous deployments in several areas, the 
 
97 RFI later removed this announcement from its website. 
98 The VoxAfrica television channel broadcast a report on this 
subject on 19 April 2012: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
tHL3t1SeAYA&feature=player_embedded. Also see “Loyalist 
soldiers move into Mali’s rebel-held North”, Reuters, 21 April 
2012. 
99 “Mali: comment Ag Gamou a échappé au MNLA et à Ansar 
Eddine”, Jeune Afrique, 11 April 2012.  
100 The movement’s declared goal was to drive out the Islamists 
from northern Mali and was composed of Imghad, Peul and 
Songhaï men, that is, the communities that would normally 
form part of the Ganda Izo movement and that had lost their 
leader, Amadou Diallo, and many fighters in a clash with MNLA 
forces on 25 March 2012. The Ganda Izo have since replaced 
Amadou Diallo with his brother, a soldier who immediately ex-
pressed his intention to serve the Malian army. There has been 
no official rapprochement so far between the Ganda Izo and the 
MRRA. Moreover, the latter has not claimed responsibility for 
any military action. At this stage, the declaration announcing 
the creation of the movement seems most likely to be a com-
munications operation aiming to make Gamou and his men le-
gitimate protagonists in possible future negotiations and indi-
cate his availability to external sponsors who might be interest-
ed in using him to gain some political influence on Mali’s fate. 
101 “Mauritanie-Niger: deux fronts en gestation pour libérer le 
Nord-Mali”, Al Akhbar indépendante, 4 June 2012. 
expulsion of government forces from towns that the in-
surgents then declared under rebel “administration”. This 
strategy clearly showed a willingness to contest Malian 
sovereignty in the north. There are no precise figures avail-
able about the number of military victims so far; between 
several to a dozen people have died in “clashes” and sieges. 
The rebels have not sought to take many prisoners, despite 
detaining some.102 While taking care of prisoners can be 
costly, they have come to represent important bargaining 
chips in negotiations in the past years. Nevertheless, Ansar 
Dine unilaterally decided to release its prisoners in mid-
April 2012.103 
B. THE EVENTS OF AGUELHOC AND  
OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS  
IN THE NORTH 
Little is known about the most tragic episode in the war 
so far, the massacre of several dozen Malian soldiers at 
Aguelhoc between 18 and 24 January 2012. On 13 Febru-
ary, the French development and cooperation minister 
noted that “summary executions … perhaps one hundred” 
had happened at Aguelhoc and indicated that the methods 
used were similar to those used by AQIM.104 The soldiers 
had their throats cut after their hands had been tied behind 
their backs. Photos have been circulating on the internet, 
although it has not been possible to verify their authentic-
ity. Between the date of the event and the minister’s 
statement, there was no official Malian communication 
about the episode. However, rumours were circulating 
and prompted soldiers’ wives to gather outside the presi-
dential palace in Bamako on 2 February – a warning sign 
that a coup was in the offing. On 18 February, the MNLA 
denied French accusations on the toumastpress website 
and claimed the incident was a set-up by the Malian army 
designed to cover up a blunder by the pilots of its Ukrain-
ian combat helicopters.105 
Western officials gave a version of the events that was close 
to that reported by toumastpress.106 A Malian commission 
of inquiry, composed exclusively of members of the gov-
ernment’s security apparatus, delivered its conclusions on 
22 February. It stated that it had “been able to gather evi-
dence and witness statements from soldiers and civilians 
 
102 Only El Watan reported on this subject. “Des prisonniers 
crient leur détresse”, El Watan, 8 April 2012.  
103 “Les islamistes d’Ansar Dine en position de force dans le 
nord du Mali”, Le Point, 16 April 2012. 
104 “Nord-Mali: Raincourt parle d’une ‘centaine’ d’éxécutions 
sommaire à Aguelhok”, Jeune Afrique, 13 February 2012.  
105 “Que s’est-il réellement passé à Aguelhoc?”, toumastpress, 
18 February 2012, http://toumastpress.com/autres/propagande-
mensongere-mali/273-que-sest-il-reellement-passe-a-aguelhoc. 
html.  
106 Crisis Group interviews, Brussels, 1 March 2012. 
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who escaped, substantiated by images showing unarmed 
Malian soldiers arrested and their hands tied behind their 
backs before being killed in cold blood”. This evidence 
has not been made public.107 In a video posted online on 
15 March, Cheikh Aoussa, ex-achamor and poet,108 and a 
longstanding lieutenant of Ag Ghali, claimed that Ansar 
Dine was present in Aguelhoc on the date of the massacre 
and indicated that there was fierce fighting but he did not 
mention any executions.  
The only certainty is that many people were killed in 
Aguelhoc between 18 and 24 January and that civilians 
were evacuated while this was going on. These events 
should be rigorously investigated in any process that takes 
place at the end of the conflict. For the moment, there are 
some very useful reports available, for example, the report 
published on 11 July 2012 by the Malian Human Rights 
Association (AMDH) and the International Human Rights 
Federation (FIDH),109 which confirms the execution of 
soldiers captured by MNLA and Ansar Dine fighters. This 
would constitute war crimes. However, it would need at 
least an official international commission of inquiry to 
find out the truth and, if need be, see that justice is done 
following these tragic events.110 
Atrocities against civilians were also committed in Tim-
buktu and Gao at the beginning of April 2012. Humani-
tarian workers in Timbuktu did not observe acts of cruelty 
against hospitalised people during this period.111 However, 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the 
FIDH, which gathered witness statements in Bamako and 
Niger, describe a high number of human rights violations 
and crimes: violence, kidnapping of young girls and rape, 
recruitment of minors by armed groups, systematic looting 
of government offices and banks, among others.112 A num-
ber of non-governmental organisations had to hurriedly 
leave Timbuktu after Malian forces retreated. The civilian 
population in Timbuktu was exposed to criminal acts, 
 
107 In the absence of access to the original report, only journal-
ists’ accounts of the press conference called by the commission 
of inquiry are available: http://www.essor.ml/actualite/article/ 
executions-sommaires-de-aguel-hoc.  
108 B. Lecocq, “That Desert is Our Country”, op. cit. 
109 “Crimes de guerre au Nord-Mali”, AMDH-FIDH, 11 July 
2012, http://www.fidh.org/IMG//pdf/rapmali592f.pdf.  
110 Mali, which is a state party to the Rome Statute, announced 
that it had asked the International Criminal Court to investigate 
the crimes committed by armed groups in the north. See “Le 
Mali veut une enquête de la CPI sur les rebelles du Nord”, Reu-
ters, 12 July 2012. 
111 Crisis Group interview, coordinator of humanitarian work, 
Paris, 27 February 2012. 
112 See “Mali: War Crimes by Northern Rebels”, Human Rights 
Watch, 30 April 2012; “Mali: five months of crisis”, Amnesty 
International, 16 May 2012; and “Crimes de guerre au Nord-
Mali”, op. cit.  
which were all the more numerous because the town’s 
military base was looted, doubling the number of weap-
ons in circulation.  
Evidently, the rebel offensive and the simultaneous flight 
of government forces left the civilian populations in a se-
curity vacuum that facilitated criminal acts and the settling 
of scores, particularly in areas where inter-communal vio-
lence and/or crime are rife. Malian refugees in Mangaïze, 
Niger, deprived of almost all their belongings and com-
pletely dependent on humanitarian aid, told Crisis Group 
they had fled for fear of the resurgence of violent crime 
rather than fear of the warring parties.113 The recruitment 
of children by armed Islamist groups and the ill-treatment 
inflicted on them are a very worrying development.114 
In the area lost to the Malian state, power was disputed 
between April and the end of June by many armed actors 
with different aims, including jihadi movements similar 
to AQIM. The security situation for civilians improved in 
April and May 2012 before deteriorating again. Ansar Dine 
sought public acceptance by taking on the task of main-
taining public order and went so far as to provide civilians 
with the opportunity to use a “hotline” to contact its mem-
bers in the event of an emergency.115 The Islamist move-
ments have established Islamic courts to deal with disa-
greements and are taking charitable initiatives.116 Western 
NGOs, which are now less numerous and employ local 
Muslim staff, are again able to provide aid to civilians in 
Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao.117 However, residents are com-
pletely subject to the Islamist groups that have taken ex-
clusive control of Gao and Timbuktu since the end of 
June and that are determined to impose their extremist 
version of Islamic practices. The destruction of the mau-
soleums of saints and other symbols of Timbuktu has 
shown the Islamists’ disregard for the local people, who 
have been rendered powerless.118  
 
113 Crisis Group interviews, five refugee families, Mangaïze camp, 
Niger, 14 March 2012. 
114 According to UNICEF, armed groups have enlisted at least 
175 boys (aged between twelve and eighteen) since the end of 
March. The agency also reports that eight girls were raped or 
sexually abused and two boys were killed and eighteen children 
wounded by exploding ammunition. See “Violence against 
children mounting in Mali”, press release, UNICEF, Bamako/ 
Geneva, 6 July 2012. 
115 Crisis Group telephone interview, 10 May 2012. 
116 See the report by the Nigerien journalist Moussa Kaka, RFI 
correspondent in Gao, 20 June 2012.  
117 Crisis Group interviews, Paris, 23 May 2012, and Brussels, 
20 June 2012. 
118 “Les mausolées de Tombouctou victimes de la vindicte 
d’Ansar Dine”, AFP, 1 July 2012. 
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C. THE GRADUAL EVICTION OF  
THE MNLA BY ANSAR DINE AND  
AQIM’S ARMED OFFSHOOTS 
Soon after the MNLA launched its offensive, Iyad Ag 
Ghali’s movement, Ansar Dine, fell in behind it and fought 
at its side without necessarily any coordination between 
the two groups. Although Ag Ghali seemed to be perma-
nently weakened following his exclusion from prepara-
tions at Zakak, he reconstituted a military unit by recruit-
ing about 40 men from an AQIM katiba led by an Ifogha 
relation named Abdelkrim El Targui.119 He then advanced 
in the wake of the MNLA, which did not look unkindly 
on these military reinforcements against a common enemy 
while insisting on the ideological differences between the 
two movements. Aguelhoc was the first battle where Ansar 
Dine’s presence was observed. In mid-March, as men-
tioned above, Ansar Dine disseminated a video on the in-
ternet extolling its military victories and glorifying its 
struggle for Islam.120 
It seems that Ansar Dine’s military contribution was deci-
sive at Tessalit to the extent that some observers credit it 
with this victory.121 Its troops were then the first to enter 
Kidal, before spectacularly evicting the MNLA from the 
centre of Timbuktu, where it raised its flag and began to 
impose Sharia law.122 Timbuktu’s fall was a turning point 
in the rebel conquest of northern Mali. Although only the 
MNLA and Ansar Dine had been active until then, other 
armed actors seemed to suddenly come to life, including 
local militias inherited from the ATT government, which 
had unclear links with AQIM. Iyad Ag Ghali managed to 
take advantage of this sudden confusion much more ef-
fectively than the MNLA. 
In Timbuktu, Iyad Ag Ghali is reported to have begun talks 
with AQIM emirs, notably Mokthar Belmokhtar, who is 
well established in the region.123 There is suspicion about 
Ansar Dine’s presence near the Algerian consulate in Gao, 
where, on 5 April, the Movement for Unicity and Jihad in 
West Africa (MUJWA), a splinter of AQIM made up of Sa-
haran rather than Algerian fighters, abducted seven Alge-
 
119 This cell (or katiba) was responsible for kidnapping and kill-
ing the French citizen, Michel Germaneau, in 2010. 
120 “Video ansarEddine”, video, YouTube, 11 March 2012, http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tr6C49Zvhlc&feature=related. 
121 Crisis Group interview, former Tuareg rebel leader, Niamey, 
17 March 2012. 
122 An informative Al Jazeera report (carefully monitored no 
doubt) showed the new Timbuktu “mayor” at work: http://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=79iwgxApZzM. 
123 “Tombouctou aux mains des Salafistes”, Africa Nova, 3 April 
2012, http://afrique.blog.lemonde.fr/2012/04/03/tombouctou- 
aux-mains-des-salafistes. 
rian diplomats.124 Militants of the Nigerian terrorist move-
ment, Boko Haram, known to have links with AQIM,125 
have been observed in Gao.126 The deployment of Iyad 
Ag Ghali’s forces in the two towns abandoned by the Ma-
lian army therefore coincides with an increased presence 
of other more radical armed Islamist movements. The 
MNLA chose not to confront Ansar Dine and AQIM, and 
gave up control of the urban centres of “Azawad” to the 
Islamists. It withdrew and occupied positions in the urban 
periphery (Timbuktu’s airport, for example), part of Gao 
and on the main roads.127  
The MUJWA has gradually consolidated its presence in 
Gao, on the invitation, according to an MNLA representa-
tive, of influential members of local Arab communities.128 
With MUJWA’s efforts towards rapprochement with the 
 
124 The split between AQIM and the MUJWA was apparently 
due to quarrels about sharing out the ransoms paid for the re-
lease of Western hostages. The MUJWA’s existence first came 
to public attention after the kidnapping of three European tour-
ists at Tindouf in Algeria on 22 October 2011. However, ac-
cording to an MNLA representative, it had already set up a sep-
arate base in northern Mali in 2008. Crisis Group interview, 29 
June 2012, Paris. On 4 March 2012, MUJAO claimed responsi-
bility for a suicide-bomb attack on the gendarmerie in Taman-
rasset, although there were no casualties. The movement seemed 
to prioritise Algerian targets. Alain Antil, Sub-Saharan Africa 
Program officer for the French Institute for International Rela-
tions (Institut français des relations internationales) assembles 
the various hypotheses about the origin of the MUJWA in “Le 
Mujao, dernier venu des mouvements islamistes armés du nord 
Mali”, Ultima Ratio, 2 May 2012, http://ultimaratio-blog.org/fr/ 
archives/4532. The paradoxical role of negotiator that Mokthar 
Belmokthar shouldered to obtain the release of Algerian diplo-
mats in Gao – that is, a situation where AQIM negotiated with 
AQIM – seems to confirm MUJAO’s ties to the jihadi leader’s 
katiba. “Pour libérer les otages algériens, des négociations avec 
Belmokthar sont en cours”, El Watan, 8 April 2012; and “Le 
groupe terroriste Ançar Eddine coupe tout contact”, El Watan, 
16 April 2012.  
125 At this stage, these links mainly involve sharing information 
and skills. A regional expert indicated that the bomb attacks 
carried out a short time ago by Boko Haram were without doubt 
the result of training provided by AQIM. Crisis Group tele-
phone interview, 3 February 2012. However, these ties should 
not be perceived as representing a unified transnational terrorist 
threat. The respective paths/careers of AQIM and Boko Haram 
are above all the product of the Algerian and Malian political 
history in the case of the former and Nigeria’s history in the 
case of the other. 
126 According to evidence presented by the journalist Moussa 
Kaka, the new chief of police in Gao, a jihadi member of MU-
JWA, claims to be a member of Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and 
al-Qaeda all at the same time. See Moussa Kaka’s report on RFI, 
op. cit. 
127 Crisis Group telephone interview, Western diplomat, 10 May 
2012. 
128 Crisis Group interview, Paris, 29 June 2012. 
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population, this led to a deadly attack against MNLA po-
sitions in the town at the end of June 2012, completing the 
eviction of the MNLA from urban centres129 and forcing 
the latter to withdraw to peripheral desert areas. 
There is still a lack of information about the sequence and 
degree of coordination between these different Islamist 
movements, but we can make some observations. First, as 
the rebel forces advanced towards the south, Ansar Dine 
grew in strategic importance and very probably in terms 
of numbers and equipment, thanks no doubt to resources 
provided by AQIM.130 Second, a provisional modus viven-
di seems to have been rapidly established between the dif-
ferent armed groups in Timbuktu and Gao, which seem to 
form the epicentre of the reconfiguration of power under-
way in northern Mali. The MNLA’s acceptance of armed 
competitors on “its” territory stems from a strategic choice 
to avoid armed confrontation. Such a confrontation even-
tually took place in Gao but not on the MNLA’s initia-
tive. For the MNLA, alienating Ansar Dine would have 
meant losing support from one of Azawad’s major com-
munities and endangering its separatist project. Ag Najim, 
the MNLA’s military chief, is a determined advocate of 
peace between all Tuareg factions.131  
Relations between the two groups gradually became more 
one-sided. Ansar Dine increased the frequency of its bold 
strategic coups and gradually replaced the MNLA. The 
latter remained paralysed both by its cautious attitude and 
dread of a violent and internecine escalation of conflict and 
also by the balance of forces, which had become unfa-
vourable as its resources diminished. It seems that Ansar 
Dine has managed to recruit some elements of the MNLA 
on a paid basis. In the words of a Western diplomat, the 
MNLA is “labour rich and cash poor while Ansar Dine is 
labour poor but cash rich”.132 These respective situations 
clearly offer different prospects. This same observer be-
lieves that the absence of a detailed political program133 
 
129 “Comment le MNLA a été chassé de Gao”, Jeune Afrique, 4 
July 2012. 
130 Crisis Group telephone interview, top-level Western security 
source, 10 May 2012. 
131 On 16 April, Ag Najim told El Watan: “It is true that Ansar 
Dine is a group that wants to see sharia law, but it has participat-
ed in the liberation of Azawad under the MNLA’s leadership. It 
represents a real tendency in our society. I do not see why peo-
ple focus on our organisation, while the biggest operations were 
conducted by MNLA fighters. There are Islamist parties in all 
Muslim countries. Why do you not want see Ansar Dine in the 
same way, as one such party?” See “‘Nous ferons tout pour que 
les otages reviennent chez eux au plus tôt’”, El Watan, 16 April 
2012. 
132 Crisis Group telephone interview, 10 May 2012.  
133 In retrospect, while the vagueness of the MNLA’s political 
program may have been fatal to its plans, it is also true that it 
ensured a broad alliance at the start of the rebellion. As one of 
and a lack of resources explain the MNLA’s inability to 
build on its military victory and make a start on establish-
ing a new state. 
The significant growth of Ansar Dine within two months 
poses a question. By advancing towards the south, notably 
towards Gao and Timbuktu, the rebellion entered socio-
logical, political and religious terrain that was undoubted-
ly more favourable to projects combining the preservation 
of Malian territorial integrity with the promotion of a rig-
orous version of Islam rather than the secular separatism 
promoted by the MNLA. Timbuktu is the region where 
AQIM established itself in 2003 and where it has built a 
network of local alliances, including with Arab militias 
tolerated and even maintained by ATT. The leaders of 
these militias have alternately supplied AQIM, negotiated 
with it over the release of hostages or worked together in 
joint trafficking operations. It was therefore not surprising 
to see these actors defending their stakes in the local po-
litical economy as the rebels advanced and Malian troops, 
which did not threaten them, withdrew.  
Iyad Ag Ghali undoubtedly has the political and symbolic 
“capital” that puts him in a better position than the MNLA 
to negotiate with existing militias in Timbuktu and Gao. 
The FIAA, military component of Timbuktu’s Arab com-
munities, was the only front to sign the Tamanrasset Ac-
cords with Iyad Ag Ghali’s MPA in 1991. As a regular 
negotiator for the release of hostages, Ag Ghali is also 
close to the political-business complex that this industry 
has generated. The game of alliances already mentioned 
strengthened Ansar Dine as it approached the south of 
Azawad. It was perhaps also able to draw on the money 
from the drug trafficking controlled by Timbuktu’s Arab 
militias or the ransoms collected over the years by AQIM.  
This is the thesis vehemently and clearly held by Mohamed 
Mahmoud El Oumrany, a senior representative of north-
ern Mali’s Arab communities. He notes just how dangerous 
the relationship was between the former government and 
organised crime.134 In brief, the new masters of Azawad 
seem to be the now autonomous former clients of the abol-
ished Malian regime. A senior Western security source 
explicitly confirmed the thesis that AQIM has made its fi-
nancial and military resources available to Ansar Dine.135 
 
the movement’s leaders told Crisis Group in January 2012, 
soon after the launch of the military offensive, “discussing the 
details now would be divisive”. Crisis Group interview, Paris, 
23 January 2012.  
134 “Mohamed Mahmoud El-Oumrany: ‘les trafiquants de drogue 
sont dans une alliance avec al-Qaïda à Tombouctou, à Gao et à 
Kidal’”, RFI, 5 April 2012.  
135 Crisis Group telephone interview, 10 May 2012. 
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V. THE COUP: COLLATERAL DAMAGE 
FROM THE NORTHERN REBELLION 
OR CONSEQUENCE OF THE LONG 
DECLINE OF THE STATE?  
The situation remained confused for long hours in Bama-
ko. By the morning of 22 March, a group of army officers 
made a televised statement from Mali Radio and Televi-
sion Corporation (Office de radiodiffusion et télévision du 
Mali, ORTM), which it had stormed the previous evening, 
and announced the creation of a National Committee for 
the Reestablishment of Democracy and the Restoration of 
the State (Comité national pour le redressement de la dé-
mocratie et la restauration de l’Etat, CNRDRE). This con-
firmed without doubt that the mutiny, which began the 
previous evening at the garrison town of Kati, about fifteen 
kilometres from Bamako, was a military coup against the 
government of President ATT.  
The president escaped from the presidential palace as the 
mutineers attacked the building and was untraceable for 
several days, protected by the presidential guard. He only 
reappeared in Bamako to sign, under pressure, a letter of 
resignation on 8 April as a prelude to a formal return to con-
stitutional order mediated by ECOWAS. This took place 
with the inauguration of the president of the National As-
sembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim president.  
A. THE BRUTAL END OF A TWENTY-YEAR 
DEMOCRATIC CAREER  
Chaired by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, the junta is 
composed of junior officers rather than senior army com-
manders. It justified the president’s overthrow, six weeks 
before the date set for the first round of the presidential 
elections (29 April) by “the government’s failure to pro-
vide adequate equipment to the defence and security forces 
fulfilling their mission to defend the country’s territorial 
integrity”.136 That ATT could not, and did not intend to, 
run did not matter to the junta. In all probability, the coup 
was not so much the result of a carefully planned initia-
tive as it was an expression of extreme discontent among 
a sector of the army about the deterioration of the security 
situation in the north. Prior to the coup, the rebels had 
taken only two months to dislodge the Malian army from 
a number of positions: Ménaka, Aguelhoc and, in particu-
lar, Tessalit and Amachach. It was a tragic irony that, after 
the coup, in just a few days, the Malian army, now with a 
broken chain of command, abandoned the three regional 
capitals of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao to the rebels. 
 
136 The junta’s first declaration on 22 March 2012 at the ORTM, 
available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wB8VHaQvQi0. 
1. A longstanding malaise within the armed forces  
In the second half of 2011, Mali seemed to be the country 
most vulnerable to the immediate consequences of the 
Libyan conflict on the Sahel. Towards the end of ATT’s 
presidency, government policy on the north was incoherent 
and there was increasingly direct and strong questioning 
of a military hierarchy accused of corruption, nepotism, 
irresponsibility and being too lax.137 The malaise within 
the armed forces was one essential factor in triggering the 
coup in a country that had formed part of a group of young 
West African democracies. Mali seemed well equipped to 
institutionalise democratic progress through relatively 
credible elections and resolve internal social, community 
and political conflicts through dialogue. It was not the 
shock of the loss of human life and the military reverses 
suffered by government forces since the beginning of the 
rebellion in the north that was the source of acute discon-
tent within the defence and security forces.  
In 2009-2010, Bamako was already buzzing with accusa-
tions of dangerous liaisons between political and military 
elites and major drug and hostage traffickers and rumours 
of plots by junior officers angry about the way the presi-
dent pampered senior officers.138 Among the reasons for 
this frustration was the way that ATT promoted officers of 
his generation to the rank of general, too hastily and un-
justifiably in the opinion of many,139 and the perception, 
accurate or exaggerated, that close associates of the pres-
ident were indulging in an unprecedented degree of cor-
ruption, wheeling and dealing. The increasing number of 
Western hostages captured in neighbouring countries and 
transferred to northern Mali, described as AQIM’s sanc-
tuary, only served to further undermine the credibility of 
the Malian state.140 Despite the perception of unprecedent-
ed laxity in the state administration, it still seemed unlikely 
that a military coup could take place in a country praised 
for its democratic system in place for twenty years, espe-
 
137 Crisis Group interviews, Malian officer and diplomats, Bam-
ako, 4-5 December 2011.  
138 In 2010, a Malian security source confirmed the discovery 
of a plot by junior officers against President ATT. Crisis Group 
interview, Crisis Group researcher and independent consultant 
based in Bamako at that time, 2010.  
139 The number of generals doubled in two years in Mali. Crisis 
Group interview, diplomat, Bamako, 30 May 2012. 24 generals 
(23 brigadiers and one major general) were appointed on 1 Oc-
tober 2010. During his two terms, ATT appointed 37 general 
officers in the army and fifteen general police inspectors, mak-
ing a total of 52 generals, compared to a total of eighteen by his 
predecessors, according to the count made by the Malian press. 
See “Armée malienne: Nommés par ATT: à quand leur mise à 
la retraite anticipée des Généraux ?”, Le Politicien africain, 25 
May 2012.  
140 Crisis Group interviews, Malian officer and diplomats, 
Bamako, 4-5 December 2011.  
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cially just a few weeks before the departure of the presi-
dent and new elections.  
2. A political history typical of West Africa  
Having achieved independence in 1960, like almost all 
the other French colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, Mali also 
experienced the kind of political upset that characterised 
the first decades of most of these states under construction. 
The first president, Modibo Keïta, a nationalist, pan-African 
and socialist, did not escape the epidemic of coups that 
hit West Africa in the 1960s. In 1968, he was overthrown 
by the military, led by Moussa Traoré, who installed a 
military regime, and, in 1976, a single-party authoritarian 
regime. Traoré remained in power for 23 years, until the 
coup of March 1991. Neither was Mali spared the violent 
pressure of social movements demanding the end of single 
parties and the return of political liberties and democracy. 
The population largely welcomed the coup that propelled 
Lieutenant-Colonel ATT onto the scene because it ended 
Traoré’s increasingly violent regime.141 The army officers 
who took power seemed to support the political changes 
desired by the civilian elites.  
A major debate between the elites about introducing new 
political, economic and social policies marked the one-
year transition period. A national conference, organised 
from 29 July to 12 August 1991, led to a draft constitution, 
a charter for political parties, an electoral code and a full 
electoral timetable for the beginning of 1992.142 The elec-
tions were held amid hopes for a lasting resolution of the 
Tuareg conflict in the north, fulfilled with the signature of 
the National Pact. However, the elections, especially the 
actual number of voters in the north, highlighted the rela-
tively weak position held by this part of the country in na-
tional politics.143 President ATT became very popular in 
 
141 Unprecedented strikes and demonstrations led by students 
and teachers’ movements in Bamako prompted the Traoré re-
gime to lead a bloody repression. The killing of dozens of stu-
dents by the security forces in January and March 1991 has-
tened Moussa Traoré’s fall, which was finally orchestrated by 
officers close to him. 
142 The constitutional referendum took place on 12 January, 
municipal elections on 19 January, legislative elections on 23 
February and 9 March and a two-round presidential election on 
12 and 26 April. 
143 The number of electors registered for the constitutional ref-
erendum held in January 1992 was 315,772 in the Timbuktu 
region, 221,574 in the Gao region and 11,653 in the Kidal re-
gion, compared to 681,152 in the Kayes region, 707,388 in the 
Koulikoro region, 768,131 in the Sikasso region, 756,959 in the 
Ségou region, 776,424 in the Mopti region, 366,403 in Bamako 
district and 628,056 outside the country. The three regions of 
the north therefore accounted for 10.5 per cent of the national 
electorate in 1992. See Le processus démocratique malien de 
1969 à nos jours, op. cit.  
his country and on the continent when he kept his prom-
ise to organise free elections at the end of the transitional 
period and went on to transfer power to Alpha Oumar 
Konaré, the civilian elected president in the second round 
of the presidential election on 26 April 1992.144  
While ATT focused on international diplomatic networks 
and became a high-profile mediator in African crises,145 
Konaré administered a rapidly changing country after years 
of economic stagnation.146 He was re-elected in May 1997, 
although opposition parties denounced the election result. 
The democratic change in government in 2002, when Ko-
naré left office, respecting the constitutional limitation of 
two terms, consolidated the young Malian democracy.147 
The former coup leader and transitional president, the re-
tired General ATT, came to power again, still basking in 
the glow of his voluntary departure ten years previously. 
His campaign was based on his image as a man of consen-
sus. He also benefited from rivalries within civilian polit-
ical elites, associated with the Konaré government and 
accused by some sectors of Malian public opinion of be-
coming unduly wealthy. However, many people felt that 
Konaré had created the conditions for ATT’s comeback, 
returning the favour of the person whose withdrawal had 
allowed him to become the first democratically elected pres-
ident of the democratic era.148 This democratic change of 
government had its dark side.  
 
144 The history professor, Alpha Oumar Konaré, was one of the 
leaders of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Alliance pour la 
démocratie au Mali, ADEMA), one of the political and civic 
movements that organised the mobilisation that led to the fall of 
Moussa Traoré’s single-party regime. ADEMA-PASJ later be-
came the country’s main political party.  
145 In 2001, the former President ATT was appointed as special 
representative of the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in the 
Central African Republic, after the failed coup against Ange-
Félix Patassé. 
146 Major infrastructure projects were launched, especially in 
Bamako, and economic growth was on the agenda, stimulated 
by gold and cotton production and by the flow of development 
aid into the country. However, poverty rates were slow to fall 
and the Konaré governments faced corruption accusations. 
Nevertheless, this did not harm Mali’s mainly positive image as 
a model democratic country in the process of consolidation. 
147 He was president of the African Union (AU) Commission 
from 2003 to 2008.  
148 The outgoing president, Alpha Oumar Konaré, did not clear-
ly support Soumaïla Cissé, whom his party, ADEMA-PASJ, 
chose and who was beaten by ATT in the second round of the 
presidential election in May 2002. See Pierre Boilley, “Prési-
dentielles maliennes: l’enracinement démocratique ?”, Poli-
tique africaine, no. 86 (June 2002), pp. 171-182. 
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3. Weakness and corruption of the state  
at a time of globalisation  
The coup in March 2012 revealed just how fragile Mali’s 
political and security structure actually was. The consoli-
dation of democracy, in the form of a stable multi-party 
system, observance of political liberties and regular elec-
tions that were generally perceived to be credible, did not 
lead to the consolidation of the state: political institutions, 
ministerial administrations, police, gendarmerie, army, 
intelligence services, public agencies and companies. The 
case of Mali shows that democracy, even when its leaders 
are really elected by the public and space exists for the 
expression of all types of political sensibilities, does not 
guarantee either an efficient and effective state or govern-
ance in the general interest. Moreover, compared to other 
young democracies in the region, the Malian public has 
never been over-enthusiastic about the ritual of elections. 
The turnout has generally been low, below 40 per cent of 
registered voters.149  
The last twenty years have also witnessed the rapid inte-
gration of West Africa into globalisation, thanks to new 
information and communications technologies, trade and 
foreign investment, but also as a result of transnational 
criminal networks, including the trafficking of people, 
drugs, cigarettes and other legal and illegal goods. Those 
who have access to transnational networks because of their 
job, especially in the state administration, have seen in-
creasing opportunities to accumulate significant wealth. 
In a context in which northern Mali has become a cross-
roads for intensive trafficking involving a multitude and 
variety of actors, the lure of quick and easy money has led 
prominent individuals to abandon any vision of sustaina-
ble development for the country and to misappropriate 
much of the international aid flowing into the country.150  
The weariness of sectors of the Malian public, including 
the middle class and wealthy urban dwellers, towards the 
 
149 At the time of the presidential election in April 1992, the 
first of the new democratic era, turnout was only 23.59 per cent 
in the first round (See Le processus démocratique malien, op. 
cit.). Turnout was always below 40 per cent in the presidential 
elections of 1997, 2002 and 2007.  
150 For years, Mali’s major donors had no longer believed the 
country was well governed despite its good image, but they al-
ways showed a lot of patience in their public statements. In pri-
vate, they made repeated and detailed criticisms of corruption, 
including the dubious award of public works contracts to busi-
nessmen directly connected to political decision-makers; the 
mixing of private interests and good works in the activities of 
the Foundation for Children (Fondation pour l’enfance) run by 
President ATT’s wife, Touré Lobbo Traoré; and the misappro-
priation of funds and materials in the education, health and oth-
er sectors. Crisis Group interview, researcher and independent 
consultant based in Bamako at that time, 2009 and 2010.  
end of the arduous presidency of ATT had become so acute 
that many people welcomed the coup, or more precisely, 
were not surprised by it. Moreover, it leaves open the 
question as to whether it would actually have been possi-
ble for ATT to organise presidential elections and a con-
stitutional referendum on 29 April, as well as potentially 
a second round on the following 13 May. Was ATT really 
on the point of leaving power as he kept repeating? The 
insistence with which members of the government con-
tinued to talk about the organisation of the ballot, including 
in the north, even when the rebellion was making progress 
in mid-January, provoked the anger of Gao residents.151 
After the coup, opinions differed about whether prepara-
tions had been made for the election, especially the elec-
toral rolls, and about ATT’s real intentions.  
A debate had begun within political circles about whether 
to proceed with the elections despite the war. Some be-
lieved it was best to elect a president with a fresh mandate 
and therefore able to respond to the challenge posed by 
the armed groups in the north. However, others believed 
it was first necessary to defend Mali’s territorial integrity. 
A third group pointed out the dangers of a constitutional 
vacuum and the need to quickly seek a political consensus. 
There was plenty of coverage in the Malian press for weeks 
but the government continued to affirm that the elections 
would take place as planned. Did ATT expect to “profit” 
from the security situation in the north to stay in power 
for another few months or even longer? It is difficult to 
believe that he did, given an appearance of fatigue and 
readiness to leave office.152 This thesis is the most credi-
ble. On the other hand, many feared he was preparing the 
ground for the former Prime Minister, Modibo Sidibé, in 
a race for succession that had in fact already begun.153  
The declared candidates in the presidential election with 
the most chance of victory seemed to be Soumaïla Cissé, 
former minister and former president of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and candidate 
of the Union for the Republic and Democracy (Union 
pour la république et la démocratie, URD); former prime 
minister and former president of the National Assembly, 
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) of the Rally for Mali (Ras-
semblement pour le Mali, RPM); the president of the Na-
tional Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, candidate of the 
Alliance for Democracy in Mali – African Party for Soli-
darity and Justice (Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali-
Parti africain pour la solidarité et la justice, ADEMA-
PASJ), the dominant party since 1992; and former prime 
 
151 See “Marche des forces vives à Gao: pas d’élections sans 
paix”, 22 septembre, 19 March 2012. 
152 Crisis Group interviews, Malian politician and diplomats, 
Bamako, 30 and 31 May 2012. 
153 Ibid.  
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minister and loyal supporter of ATT, Modibo Sidibé, who 
was not the leader of a political party.  
Created in July 2010 by a group of ministers and promi-
nent figures close to President ATT and his wife, the Party 
for Economic and Social Development (Parti pour le dé-
veloppement économique et social, PDES) seemed to be 
the crucible from which would emerge the candidate fa-
voured by the outgoing president, but the struggle for the 
leadership of the party154 had immediately weakened it.155  
B. THE COUP’S AFTERMATH: CONFUSION 
AND CHAOS IN THE SOUTH  
The leaders of the military coup began their period in pow-
er in a way that ruled them out as constructive interlocu-
tors, if they were not already disqualified as such by the 
coup itself. They arrested prominent members of ATT’s 
government, looted shops and restaurants in Bamako’s 
city centre and stole private vehicles.156 The tone and 
atmosphere of the first televised broadcast by Captain 
Sanogo and the junta’s spokesman, Lieutenant Amadou 
Konaré, on the morning of 22 March 2012, was more 
reminiscent of post-football match celebrations than a 
solemn announcement of a politically motivated change 
of government. However, they announced the creation of 
the CNRDRE, which established its base in the garrison 
town of Kati, where the mutiny began and where the fam-
 
154 Two of the party’s organisers, Ahmed Diané Séméga, the 
equipment and transport minister under ATT, and Jeamille Bit-
tar, a wealthy businessman and president of the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, intended to contest in the presidential 
election. However, neither of them received the support of 
President ATT who seemed to have instigated the founding of 
the PDES.  
155 Other parties and prominent individuals in the Malian politi-
cal landscape included Tiébilé Dramé’s Party for National Re-
covery (Parti pour la renaissance nationale, PARENA); Moun-
taga Tall’s National Congress for Democratic Initiative (Con-
grès national d’initiative démocratique, CNID); Housseini Ami-
on Guindo’s Convergence for the Development of Mali (Con-
vergence pour le développement du Mali, CODEM); Oumar 
Mariko’s African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence 
(Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l’indépendance, SA-
DI); future transitional Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra’s 
Rally for the Development of Mali (Rassemblement pour le dé-
veloppement du Mali, RDM); Choguel Maïga’s Patriotic Move-
ment for Renewal (Mouvement patriotique pour le renouveau, 
MPR); and African Convergence for Renewal (Convergence 
africaine pour le renouveau, CARE), led by Cheick Boucadry 
Traoré, son of former president Moussa Traoré. In the Malian 
context, the names of these leaders counted for much more than 
those of their parties, which were almost exclusively created to 
serve the ambitions of their leaders. 
156 A Crisis Group researcher was in Bamako during the events 
and observed this behaviour during and following the coup. 
ilies of soldiers sent to the front had demonstrated their 
anger. African organisations and the international commu-
nity immediately and unanimously condemned the coup.  
1. Polarised political circles  
The main political parties represented in the National As-
sembly, with the notable exception of the African Solidari-
ty for Democracy and Independence (Solidarité africaine 
pour la démocratie et l’indépendance, SADI), also con-
demned the coup. The deputy and historic leader of SADI, 
Oumar Mariko,157 and a few other lesser known politicians 
were among the founders of a movement that was favour-
able to a military overthrow of the ATT government, the 
Coordination of Patriotic Organisations of Mali (Coordi-
nation des organisations patriotiques du Mali, COPAM).158 
The member organisations of the coalition, such as the 
Popular Movement of 22 March 2012 (Mouvement popu-
laire du 22 mars 2012, MP 22), were clearly created to 
oppose the dominant social and political forces.159 CO-
PAM believed that “it is absolutely necessary to restore 
democracy” to the country and that “it is the unquestionable 
right of every people to freely choose its own destiny”. It 
denounced the “national chaos caused by the lax attitude 
and mismanagement of the former president, Amadou 
Toumani Touré, members of the former government and 
parliament”.160  
The alliance between Sanogo and COPAM activists unit-
ed youth with no jobs or education and vindictive military 
elements whose common enemy was the old Malian elites 
and foreign actors who did not understand the arguments 
in favour of a coup to “restore democracy”. Their straight-
forward discourse, well articulated by eloquent and organ-
ised leaders, rallied some support in the streets of Bamako. 
 
157 See “Oumar Mariko, un vilain petit canard dans le marigot 
politique malien”, Slate Afrique, 23 May 2012. 
158 According to the statement made by COPAM, the coalition 
formed on 6 April 2012 included trade unions, civil society or-
ganisations and political parties, notably the Popular Rally for 
the Defence of the Homeland (Rassemblement populaire pour 
la défense de la patrie, RPDP), the Patriotic Convergence for 
the Defence of Mali (Convergence patriotique pour la défense 
du Mali, COPADEM), the Alliance for Democracy and the Re-
public (Alliance pour la démocratie et la république, ADR) and 
the Popular Movement of 22 March 2012 (Mouvement popu-
laire du 22 mars 2012, MP 22).  
159 COPAM’s other leaders are the trade union leader, Hamma-
doun Amion Guindo of the Trade Union Coordination of Ma-
lian Workers (Coordination syndicale des travailleurs du Mali), 
Younouss Hamèye Dicko, Hamèye Founé Mahalmadane and 
Mohamed Tabouré. 
160 COPAM statement on the website of the SADI party, http:// 
www.partisadi.net/2012/04/declaration-de-la-coordination-des-
organisations-patriotiques-du-mali-copam/#more-2579, 9 April 
2012. 
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Senior army officers, some of whom were arrested, re-
mained silent after the coup, for fear of reprisals but per-
haps also because they were not completely against the 
overthrow of the government and of some of their brothers-
in-arms favoured by ATT in recent years. 
2. ECOWAS actions and the junta’s reactions 
Despite taking power under the contemptuous eyes of ob-
servers, Sanogo initially listened to the injunctions that 
came from every side, especially from ECOWAS, which 
held an emergency meeting of heads of state and govern-
ment in Abidjan on 27 March. Unsurprisingly, it demand-
ed an immediate return to constitutional order, mandated 
the president of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, to lead 
mediation efforts and decided to send a delegation of six 
heads of state to Bamako161 to communicate the organisa-
tion’s message to the new de facto authorities and discuss 
the practicalities of “constitutional normalisation”. This 
delegation was unable to land in the Malian capital be-
cause a crowd of pro-junta demonstrators took over the 
airport runway, clearly under the supervision of the coup 
leaders themselves. 
On their return to Abidjan, the heads of state decided to 
deploy a massive arsenal of political, diplomatic, economic 
and financial sanctions against Mali for as long as the junta 
remained in power. These drastic sanctions included the 
closure of Mali’s borders with all ECOWAS member states 
– a crippling move for a landlocked country dependent on 
its neighbours’ ports – and froze the country’s accounts in 
the regional central bank. These decisions were similar 
to those taken during the post-electoral conflict in Côte 
d’Ivoire in 2011. A mini-summit on 29 March confirmed 
the decision “to put the ECOWAS Standby Force on high 
alert for all eventualities [sic]”.162 The threat of regional 
military intervention was therefore quickly on the agenda 
but the statement was ambiguous, all the more so since 
two simultaneous crises were taking place: the junta’s coup 
in Bamako and the MNLA’s declaration of independence 
of the state of Azawad, representing an attack on the sov-
ereignty of an ECOWAS member.  
Burkina Faso’s mediation efforts involved the almost 
continuous presence in Bamako of its foreign minister, 
Djibril Bassolé, accompanied by the Ivorian regional in-
 
161 Presidents Alassane Ouattara (Côte d’Ivoire), who then chaired 
ECOWAS, Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso), Boni Yayi (Be-
nin), Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Liberia), Goodluck Jonathan (Nige-
ria) and Mahamadou Issoufou (Niger).  
162 Communiqué of the emergency mini-summit of ECOWAS 
heads of state and government on the situation in Mali, Abid-
jan, Côte d’Ivoire, 29 March 2012. 
tegration minister, Adama Bictogo.163 The economic em-
bargo had a major impact on the outcome of the first 
negotiations. On 6 April, Bassolé and Captain Sanogo 
signed a framework agreement on the return of constitu-
tional order in exchange for an amnesty for those who 
had participated in the coup, legal provisions to strength-
en the army and mention of a “role” and “place”, to be 
defined later, for the CNRDRE in the transition.164 This 
agreement did not therefore sideline the coup leaders. It 
provided for the president of the National Assembly to step 
in as ATT’s formal replacement for a period of 40 days 
during which elections would be organised, as stipulated 
by the constitution. It also established “transitional or-
gans” to govern the country for longer than this very short 
period. The CNRDRE was the only Malian signatory to 
what was a crucial political agreement about the country’s 
future.  
In the aftermath of the 6 April agreement, the deposed 
president, ATT, reappeared in Bamako to make his resig-
nation official and open the way for Dioncounda Traoré 
to take office. He was sworn in on 12 April, in the pres-
ence of Captain Sanogo. The constitutional interim period 
ended on 22 May and uncertainty continued over whether 
to extend this period and over the roles of the interim pres-
ident and the transitional prime minister. The latter was 
“head of the government” and “plenipotentiary”, accord-
ing to the framework agreement, and his mission was “to 
lead the transition, manage the crisis in the north of Mali 
and organise free, transparent and democratic elections”.165 
However, the new president declared his willingness to 
play a concrete role. This did not please those, including 
civilians and army officers, who saw him as a symbol of 
the former government. Moreover, he had never been very 
popular on the political scene despite his position as pres-
ident of the National Assembly and the fact that he had 
been the most important political party’s candidate for the 
previously scheduled presidential elections.  
According to a Malian politician, “Traoré was only in 
power for four days, from 12 to 16 April”166 after he was 
sworn in. He began to lose power on the evening of 16 
April when the military, in response to junta orders, car-
ried out a new wave of summary arrests of politicians and 
army officers, including close associates of the interim 
president, although he had just accepted the appointment 
of Cheick Modibo Diarra as transitional prime minister. 
Traoré had no input into this choice, respecting the frame-
 
163 He was forced to resign in Côte d’Ivoire after he was impli-
cated in a case of corruption.  
164 Framework agreement to implement the solemn undertaking 
of 1 April, 6 April 2012, articles 7.a, d and e. See Appendix D. 
165 Ibid, article 6. 
166 Crisis Group interview, Malian politician, Bamako, 30 May 
2012. 
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work agreement that gave this prerogative to the co-sig-
natories, the CNRDRE and the Burkina Faso mediator on 
behalf of ECOWAS. Interlocutors in Bamako confirm that 
the junta was mainly responsible for the choice of prime 
minister,167 with the approval and perhaps the benevolence 
of the Burkinabè president.168  
Another extraordinary ECOWAS summit that took place 
on 26 April 2012 extended the transitional period by twelve 
months and “the mandate of the transitional organs, nota-
bly the Interim President, the Prime Minister and the Cab-
inet by the same twelve-month period”.169 The summit 
also instructed the ECOWAS Commission “to commence, 
with immediate effect, the deployment of the ECOWAS 
Standby Force”.170 These two decisions caused an outcry 
in Bamako among the junta and its civilian supporters. 
They wanted Traoré to step down on 22 May and his suc-
cessor to be chosen by a “national convention”. It is diffi-
cult to say whether or not Sanogo was hoping to return to 
the spotlight as president of the transition, but he certainly 
intended to have a strong influence over whoever was 
appointed. Moreover, the junta believed that the Malian 
army needed logistical and material support from ECO-
WAS and other international partners, not regional troops. 
The announcement was a blessing for COPAM, which was 
able to mobilise on the issue of defending Mali against 
the “ECOWAS diktat” and violation of the framework 
agreement.171  
The deadly clashes that suddenly broke out in Bamako on 
30 April 2012 between the “red berets” of the 33rd Para-
chute commando regiment, based in the city centre, and 
the “green berets”, who supported the junta, revealed the 
fragmented nature of the military. This event finally con-
 
167 Crisis Group interviews, Malian politician and senior offi-
cial, and diplomats, Bamako, 30 and 31 May 2012. 
168 Cheick Modibo Diarra, astrophysicist and former employee 
of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), popular in Mali and considered to be a role model for 
youth, has had good relations with President Blaise Compaoré 
for some years. He was a member of the Board of Directors of 
the International Council for Solidarity with Burkina Faso 
(Conseil international de solidarité avec le Burkina Faso, CIS-
AB), an organisation based in France that promotes Burkina 
Faso and its president, Blaise Compaoré, in Europe and the rest 
of the world. See the website: www.cisab.org. In 2011, Diarra 
formed a political party, the Rally for the Development of Mali 
(Rassemblement pour le développement du Mali, RDPM), in 
preparation for the presidential election scheduled for 2012 in 
which he planned to contest.  
169 Final communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of ECO-
WAS Heads of State and Government, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 
26 April 2012.  
170 Ibid.  
171 “Déclaration de la COPAM suite au communiqué final du 
sommet extraordinaire de la Cedeao du 26 April 2012”, 28 
April 2012, http://www.partisadi.net/tag/copam. 
solidated Sanogo’s power, or more precisely, that of the 
junta, which amounted to more than him and whose men 
had come out on top. The attack was reportedly launched 
by a group of “red berets” close to ATT in response to re-
ports that their leader was about to be arrested, but there 
were also rumours that the incident was an attempted 
“counter-coup” against the junta.172 In any case, this epi-
sode was the deadliest so far in the crisis. The number of 
victims is not known and neither is the fate of wounded 
soldiers who were taken to the military hospital in Kati. 
Following these internal clashes within the army, the gov-
ernment dissolved the red beret regiment, part of which 
was responsible for security of the presidency under ATT.  
Interim President Traoré and Prime Minister Diarra attend-
ed a new extraordinary ECOWAS summit on 3 May 2012 
in Dakar. In response to the junta’s negative reaction to 
its instructions regarding the Standby Force, the regional 
body decided that the deployment would only take place 
“as soon as the Malian authorities make the relevant re-
quest”.173 Moreover, the arrests in April and May 2012 
clearly aimed to show the interim president that power 
remained in Kati, where Captain Sanogo received a stream 
of visits from government officials, businessmen and civil 
society representatives. Sanogo had even had printed offi-
cial portraits of himself as head of state and he had clearly 
quickly got a taste for power.174  
The pro-coup movement’s opposition to Traoré continued 
in Bamako with increasingly virulent verbal attacks on him, 
broadcast by several private radio stations, a rare phenom-
enon in the public debate in Mali. Efforts to weaken the 
president reached their height on 21 May 2012, when 
demonstrators Traoré had agreed to see in the presidential 
palace violently assaulted the 70-year-old president. There 
had been a lively debate from mid-April onwards about 
the interim president’s future after 22 May, between those 
who thought he should continue in post and those who 
wanted him out, including the junta and COPAM. The 
organisers of the demonstration and the security forces 
did nothing to stop the demonstrators and are therefore 
implicated. The matter has been referred to the Malian 
justice system as attempted murder and an investigation is 
underway. According to several sources, units of the po-
lice’s Mobile Security Group (Groupe mobile de sécurité, 
GMS), which is under the authority of the internal security 
minister, refused to rescue the president.175  
 
172 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Bamako, 30 May 2012.  
173 Final communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of ECO-
WAS Heads of State and Government, Dakar, Senegal, 3 May 
2012.  
174 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Bamako, 30 May 2012. 
175 Members of a dissident police and gendarmerie trade union 
were implicated. 
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However, on 20 May 2012, the Burkinabè foreign minister, 
Bassolé, mediating on behalf of ECOWAS, announced he 
had reached a new agreement with Sanogo, by which the 
latter was granted the status of former head of state, enjoy-
ing all the benefits due to this rank, including an allow-
ance, accommodation and bodyguards.176 In exchange, he 
finally agreed to extend the mandate of the interim presi-
dent to one year and promised that the junta would re-
nounce any political role.177 There is no indication that the 
junta played a direct role in the 21 May events. However, 
the soldiers who were present in the presidential palace 
clearly did nothing to prevent the excesses and the assault 
on the president. In a sign of their distrust, the military 
blocked Traoré’s departure for Paris for two hours at the 
airport, despite the prime minister’s presence. These un-
acceptable acts had the paradoxical effect of lowering 
tensions because they made the most hardline pro-junta 
elements act in a more restrained fashion, once they real-
ised that they could be subject to legal proceedings. 
3. Controversial ECOWAS efforts  
at mediation 
ECOWAS monopolised the post-coup diplomatic re-
sponse, through the mediation entrusted to Burkina Faso. 
The succession of summit meetings of heads of state indi-
cated concern and a willingness to find a response to the 
dual challenge posed by the break with democracy and 
the Malian state’s loss of sovereignty over more than two 
thirds of its territory. However, most actors, observers 
and diplomats consider that the intervention by ECOWAS, 
and particularly by Burkina Faso, has mainly had a nega-
tive impact. A Malian observer said: “I have never seen 
such chaotic and unilateral mediation”.178 He denounced 
the decision to make Sanogo an almost exclusive inter-
locutor and co-signatory of the 6 April framework agree-
ment, effectively making the mediator a stakeholder in 
the establishment of the transitional organs, and the ap-
pointment of the prime minister and the government with-
out any consultation with Mali’s main political forces. This 
observer also criticised the generous decision to grant 
Sanogo the status of former president. ECOWAS later 
revoked this decision, initially on 6 June 2012 and then 
more clearly at the 28-29 June summit.179  
 
176 ECOWAS heads of state later reversed this decision, a clear 
disavowal of Burkina Faso’s mediation. See below. 
177 See “Crise au Mali: accord signé pour une période de transi-
tion de 12 mois”, Jeune Afrique, 21 May 2012.  
178 Crisis Group interview, Malian politician, Bamako, 30 May 
2012.  
179 ECOWAS heads of state, meeting in Lomé, Togo, “reiterat-
ed ECOWAS’s non-recognition of the CNRDRE as well as any 
status of Head of State or former Head of State bestowed on 
Captain Amadou Sanogo”, point 10 of the Communiqué of the 
It is difficult to disagree with the strong criticism of ECO-
WAS’s actions. As so often happens, the organisation 
was firm and clear about its principled refusal to counte-
nance the breakdown of constitutional order and even 
took stringent measures, including a total embargo, which 
shocked some Malians but was coherent with its stated 
principles and aimed to put maximum pressure on the 
junta. However, from the moment ECOWAS designated 
a mediator, it seemed to give him a free hand to conduct 
negotiations. Although the organisation’s chair, the Ivori-
an Ouattara, also sent his regional integration minister, 
Adama Bictogo, to support the Burkinabè minister, it was 
the latter who monopolised the negotiations in Bamako. 
According to several sources, heads of state at the 26 
April summit expressed different opinions about the me-
diation and these opinions still hold.180 They agreed that 
the Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, would work 
with Compaoré to mediate,181 which demonstrated a de-
sire to increase supervision over Burkina Faso’s efforts.  
The announcement of the composition of the government 
on 25 April included the appointment of Sadio Lamine Sow 
to the strategic post of minister of state for foreign affairs.182 
Sow had been a discreet special adviser to President Com-
paoré in Ouagadougou for three decades. This strength-
ened the feeling that the mediator was having a dispropor-
tionate influence on the Malian transition.183 The general 
perception of the government varied depending on the 
interlocutor. Although it certainly did not represent a gov-
ernment of national unity even after wide consultations, 
some welcomed the political neutrality of most of its mem-
bers.184 Prime Minister Diarra, son-in-law of the former 
autocratic president, Moussa Traoré, had nevertheless 
 
ECOWAS Commission, released after the meeting to discuss 
the situation in Mali. Also see Final Communiqué of the 41st 
Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Conference of Heads of 
State and Government, Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire, 28-29 
June 2012.  
180 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Bamako, 29-31 May 
2012.  
181 Final communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of ECO-
WAS Heads of State and Government, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 
26 April 2012. 
182 “Mali: Sadio Lamine Sow fait le grand écart”, Jeune Afrique, 
5 June 2012.  
183 Moreover, this minister is the only member of the govern-
ment to have already had such a function. An interlocutor of 
Crisis Group questioned how such a close adviser to President 
Compaoré could establish good working relations with Mauri-
tania, a full member that has difficult relations with Burkina 
Faso. Another influential and controversial special adviser to 
Compaoré, the Mauritanian Moustafa Ould Limam Chafi, is 
considered by Nouakchott to be an opponent and a warrant has 
been issued for his arrest. Crisis Group interview, Malian poli-
tician, Bamako, 30 May 2012.  
184 Crisis Group interviews, politicians, researcher, Bamako, 
30-31 May 2012.  
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called on one of the latter’s former economy and finance 
ministers (Tiéna Coulibaly).185 In September 2010, Diarra 
had himself created a political party, the Rally for the De-
velopment of Mali (Rassemblement pour le developpe-
ment du Mali, RDM) with the objective of contesting in 
the 2012 presidential election.186 Four ministers came from 
the diaspora and three officers occupied key ministries.187 
Modibo Diarra’s government seriously suffered from the 
circumstances in which it was formed. As with the choice 
of prime minister, there was not much consultation among 
Malian political circles about the other members of the 
government. The desire to form a government composed 
of individuals that were not too close to the ATT clan was 
certainly understandable, as the former regime had been 
responsible for weakening the state over the previous ten 
years. But it was predictable that a team formed during 
obscure negotiations between the junta and ECOWAS me-
diators would not be perceived as legitimate. Not surpris-
ingly, there was a lot of criticism in Bamako about the 
unrepresentative nature of the Diarra government and its 
inability to formulate a roadmap to fulfil the two main mis-
sions of the transition: resolving the crisis in the north and 
preparing free and transparent elections within one year.188  
Approval of the Diarra government came, a little para-
doxically, from ECOWAS. A sub-group of heads of state 
that was acting as a Contact Group on Mali met on 7 July 
in Ouagadougou. An interesting feature of this meeting 
was the participation of Mali’s major players, notably 
parliamentarians, the Higher Council of Local Authorities 
(Haut conseil des collectivités territoriales), political par-
ties, whether they were represented in the National Assem-
bly or not, trade unions, women and youth organisations, 
the Collective of Northern Citizens (Collectif des ressor-
tissants du Nord, COREN) and a range of civil society as-
sociations.189 However, pro-junta movements, notably the 
COPAM and the MP 22, boycotted the meeting, along 
with Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s party (IBK Mali 2012). 
The latter, a former prime minister, was a declared candi-
date in the aborted presidential election, who, like other 
Bamako politicians, wanted to have an influence over the 
 
185 “Les secrets du nouveau gouvernement malien”, Jeune 
Afrique, 26 April 2012. 
186 However, Cheick Modibo Diarra was not among the favour-
ites to win this presidential election, given that his party had 
only recently been formed and that he himself had not been on 
the political scene for long.  
187 Colonel-Major Yamoussa Camara (defence), General Tiéfing 
Konaté (internal security) and Colonel Mamadou Sinko Cou-
libaly, former director of Captain Sanogo’s cabinet (territorial 
administration). 
188 Crisis Group interviews, politicians, senior official, diplomats, 
Bamako, 30-31 May 2012.  
189 Communiqué of the Second Meeting of the Contact Group 
on Mali, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 7 July 2012. 
management of the transitional period.190 These move-
ments felt that the solution to Malian political problems 
should be sought in Mali and that it was not appropriate to 
go to Burkina Faso to form a new government in Mali.191  
Neither interim President Traoré (whose attendance was an-
nounced), nor Prime Minister Diarra attended the meeting. 
The minister for Malians abroad and African integration, 
Rokia Traoré Guikiné, was the sole government representa-
tive. The ECOWAS Contact Group requested, or more 
exactly, demanded the formation of a national unity gov-
ernment representing at least a reshuffle of Diarra’s cabinet, 
by 31 July 2012.192 The heads of state also demanded “that 
full light be shed on the physical attack against President 
Dioncounda Traoré and that charges be brought against 
the perpetrators of this attack”. They clearly expressed a 
desire to confirm the position of the interim president, 
still in Paris, at the heart of political arrangements, by 
calling on “ECOWAS to support the Government of Mali 
with a view to arranging the return of the Interim President, 
His Excellency Mr Dioncounda Traoré, and guaranteeing 
his protection and physical integrity”.193 
 
190 See “Boycott de la 2ème réunion du groupe de contact à Oua-
ga: la COPAM, le Premier ministre, IBK Mali 2012 et autres 
tombent dans l’excès”, L’indépendant, 10 July 2012.  
191 Ibid. Also see “Déclaration du BPN/RPM relative à la parti-
cipation du RPM au mini-sommet de la Cedeao du 7 juillet 
2012 à Ouagadougou”, 6 July 2012, http://www.ibk-2012.com/ 
Pourquoi-le-RPM-ne-participe-pas.html.  
192 The final communiqué of the meeting stated: “In order to 
promote political stability and create favourable conditions for 
a peaceful way out of the crisis, the Member Heads of State of 
the Contact Group support the demand of the socio-political 
stakeholders of Mali, including political leaders and Civil Soci-
ety, and call on them to hold consultations and make proposals 
to the Interim President regarding the formation, before 31 July 
2012, of a Government of national unity which will be respon-
sible for the implementation of the roadmap for ending the cri-
sis”. Communiqué of the 2nd Meeting of the Contact Group on 
Mali, op. cit.  
193 Ibid.  
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VI. WHAT DOES THE FUTURE  
HOLD FOR MALI? 
The asymmetry of the military balance of forces between 
the north and south, coupled with the diplomatic and tech-
nical delays and obstacles to the eventual constitution of 
a military force able to reconquer the territory, makes it 
likely that the de facto partition of the country will con-
tinue in the coming months. Mali’s immediate future is 
being played out in the north by armed groups that dis-
pute its control and depends in the south on the ability of 
its leaders to overcome a major institutional crisis. It is still 
not known who really is in command in the south. The 
choices made by the international actors who have been 
involved in intense diplomatic activity since the coup, also 
largely condition the development of this double crisis.  
A. POLITICAL ALLIANCES, SPLITS AND 
REORGANISATION IN NORTHERN MALI  
The situation in northern Mali is changing rapidly and 
there is only fragmentary knowledge of what is really go-
ing on. One major question is whether the MNLA can sur-
vive. Is its plan for self-determination, backed by Tuareg 
nationalist tradition and devoid of a religious agenda, able 
to counter the already well-advanced Islamist attempts at 
subversion? The MNLA’s capacity to impose its power and 
confront those who dispute its self-proclaimed monopoly 
of “legitimate violence” is declining. 
At the time of writing, Iyad Ag Ghali, who has significant 
financial resources, has absorbed MNLA leaders and fight-
ers into his movement. For example, Alghabass Ag Intal-
lah, the future amenokal of the Ifoghas, previously believed 
to be a sympathiser of the MNLA, now speaks on behalf 
of Ansar Dine.194 Many in the separatist movement’s po-
litical bureau, who are not in the field, denounce what 
they consider an unacceptable compromise of their initial 
project. The line defended by MNLA leaders continues to 
be followed in the field, although undoubtedly with less 
vigour than in January 2012. 
Many Malian Tuaregs remain loyal to Iyad Ag Ghali even 
if they disapprove of his religious views. A large propor-
tion of his fighters are Tuareg from the Ifogha tribe and 
have relatives in the MNLA.195 One of the recurring issues 
during preparations for rebellion in Zakak was the risk of 
a tribal division of the movement, similar to the one that 
 
194 According to Mossa Ag Acharatoumane, his role in Ansar 
Dine is to promote a rapprochement between his movement and 
the MNLA. Crisis Group interview, Paris, 29 June 2012. 
195 Crisis Group telephone interview, regional expert, 3 April 
2012. 
proved fatal to the insurgent Tuaregs in the 1990s. It is 
with reference to these concerns, as well as to the change 
in the balance of forces between the two groups since 
March 2012, that it is necessary to interpret the dynamic 
relationship between the MNLA and Ansar Dine. There 
have been attempts to iron out the tensions between the 
two groups, notably on 18 March,196 after Ansar Dine dis-
seminated their Aguelhoc video, but they failed to end the 
competition between the two organisations.  
At the end of May 2012, the two movements began anoth-
er round of consultations in Gao, with a view to reaching 
a lasting reconciliation. On 26 May, they signed a draft 
agreement that focused on two points: Ansar Dine recog-
nised the Azawad independence proclaimed by the MNLA 
and the latter accepted the Islamic character of the new 
state and, consequently, the imposition of Sharia law.197 
MNLA leaders wanted Ansar Dine to commit to driving 
out AQIM as part of this agreement, but the movement 
only made vague promises.198 Two days later, the MNLA’s 
expatriate leaders denounced this agreement for funda-
mental ideological reasons, for fear of the West’s reaction 
(where some of them were living) and, finally, because 
they questioned Ansar Dine’s sincerity about wanting to 
fight AQIM. 
The divisions between Ansar Dine and the MNLA deep-
ened after this failed attempt at compromise. The two 
groups exchanged shots in Kidal and Timbuktu,199 while 
female supporters of the MNLA demonstrated their rejec-
tion of a repressive religious order.200 Iyad Ag Ghali’s fail-
ure to condemn MUJWA’s attack on the MNLA in Gao 
at the end of June widened the gap separating the Tuareg 
leader from the MNLA. However, his Tuareg fighters do 
not necessarily share Ag Ghali’s radical position, and they 
could align themselves with the MNLA in the event of inter-
tribal confrontations such as those that took place in Gao.201 
During the military campaign, Ansar Dine acted as a buffer 
between the MNLA and AQIM. After the offensive began, 
the MNLA promised to combat terrorism provided that 
the international community supplied it with the necessary 
resources. It seemed to want to earn international legiti-
macy by becoming an auxiliary in a “war on terror” that 
 
196 Crisis Group interview, Tuareg political leader, Niamey, 17 
March 2012. 
197 “Nord du Mali: les rebelles touareg et les islamistes d’Ansar 
Dine fusionnent”, Jeune Afrique, 27 May 2012. 
198 Crisis Group telephone interview, 2 June 2012. 
199 “Nouvel accrochage entre Touareg et islamistes dans le nord 
du Mali”, Bamako.com, 13 June 2012, http://news.abamako.com/ 
h/2170.html. 
200 “Nouvelle manifestation contre les islamistes à Kidal”, Le 
Temps d’Algérie, 6 June 2012.  
201 Crisis Group interview, MNLA leader, Paris, 29 June 2012. 
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was not its own.202 Even if the MNLA receives the de-
sired military assistance and even if it really wants to use 
it against AQIM, it is uncertain what the results of such a 
move would be. AQIM has a lot of firepower and is an 
elusive, yet deeply-rooted organisation in northern Mali.  
Finally, although the MNLA evacuated Western residents 
from Gao and Timbuktu in April, it was Ansar Dine that 
helped to arrange the release of two hostages. The MNLA 
therefore seems to be less effective than its Salafi rival, 
precisely in the field in which its leaders claim to excel. Its 
unconvincing positioning is tactical but is also a result of 
the exhaustion of its resources: eventually, the movement 
has to look outside Mali to the West for the resources that 
would allow it to avoid suffocation. It is possible that the 
Libyan equipment source, so plentiful between April and 
August 2011, has not completely dried up.203 However, 
the political reorganisation underway in southern Libya is 
not favourable to the Tuaregs. Several experts have ex-
pressed their scepticism about the idea that the MNLA 
can rely on permanent support from within Libya, even 
though the movement’s chief, Ag Najim, remained loyal to 
Qadhafi after his return to Mali and seems to have helped 
the overthrown regime’s secret service’s number two, 
Abdallah Senussi, to escape.204  
Within Mali, the MNLA has been unable to resist the Is-
lamist groups, or, at the very least, it has adopted a wait-
and-see policy. However, it has benefited from the support 
of an immensely respected figure in the north, the tradi-
tional chief (amenokal) of the Kel Adagh, Intallah Ag 
Attaher, who, in a letter made public, disavowed Iyad Ag 
Ghali, a member of his own group, to the advantage of a 
movement dominated by the Idnan. A senior traditional 
authority of the Kounta, the most prestigious Arab group 
in northern Mali, has made a similar pronouncement. These 
declarations of support emphasise just how divisive the 
fundamentalist position taken by Iyad Ag Ghali is within 
the Tuareg community. Attempts to mobilise the public in 
favour of Azawad, especially in Gao, are another facet of 
 
202 The MNLA seems forced to play the “extraversion” card to 
consolidate its viability as a legitimate political actor. A hypo-
thetical future Azawad must also lie on links with the interna-
tional system. In the opinion of a Paris representative of the 
MNLA, the future development of Azawad depends on its ca-
pacity to attract international development cooperation aid cur-
rently controlled by Bamako. This reasoning reveals the extent 
to which external intervention is as much part of the Malian 
problem as its solution, as shown by the case of the PSPSDN, 
described above. That AQIM kidnaps Western hostages to ex-
tract substantial ransoms also obeys the logic of “extraversion”.  
203 Crisis Group interview, former Tuareg rebel leader, Niamey, 
14 March 2012. 
204 “Libye: le récit exclusif de la cavale d’Abdallah Senoussi”, 
Jeune Afrique, 2 April 2012.  
the MNLA’s search for legitimacy.205 Meanwhile, Ansar 
Dine is repressing the practices that it judges incompati-
ble with its interpretation of Islam but could also become 
more popular if it manages to maintain order and eliminate 
the petty crime that promotes perceptions of insecurity 
among the public. 
Attentive observers in the region do not believe it is in 
Iyad Ag Ghali’s interest “to cross the red line” by becom-
ing too close to jihadis. He is more likely to focus on mak-
ing sure he is at the centre of decision-making and main-
tains the brokering capacity that has brought past political 
successes: between the rebels and Bamako, between Ba-
mako and Algiers and between Bamako and AQIM. This 
certainly seems to have been the driving force behind the 
release of an Italian hostage detained by AQIM since Feb-
ruary 2011 and the Swiss hostage kidnapped in Timbuktu 
shortly after its fall.206 While operationally associating him-
self with AQIM, Iyad has taken care not to endanger his 
chances of political survival by showing his ability to act 
on the hostages issue. This undoubtedly makes him useful 
to AQIM’s leaders, who are unable to place themselves as 
actors in political negotiations.  
Ansar Dine de facto provides another service to AQIM by 
intervening between jihadis and the MNLA. There is no 
evidence that the MNLA would have challenged AQIM 
militarily in the absence of Ansar Dine but the question 
would be higher up the agenda without Ansar Dine. The 
MUJWA and Ansar Dine are mainly composed of local 
people. They form a kind of vernacular AQIM, which was 
itself founded outside Mali. This process seems to be in 
accordance with the aim of Abdelmalek Droukdal, AQIM’s 
highest authority, to “gradually” impose his political pro-
ject on northern Mali by leaving the management of the 
local situation to Ansar Dine while AQIM concentrates 
on its jihadi activities.207  
However, coercion is now being used to impose Sharia 
law in the north (strict clothing code, a ban on consuming 
alcohol and smoking, corporal punishments for offend-
ers),208 to the extent of provoking sometimes violent reac-
 
205 The MNLA rationalises this as “a war to raise awareness 
rather than a fratricidal confrontation”. See “Le sombre Iyad 
Ag Ghaly acculé de toute part dans l’Azawad”, toumastpress, 
24 April 2012, http://toumastpress.com/actualites/actualite/684-
iyad-ag-ghaly-accule-toute-part-azawad.html. 
206 “Mali: les dessous de la libération de l’otage Béatrice Stock-
lyet”, RFI, 25 April 2012; and “Mali: le récit de la libération de 
l’otage italienne Maria Sandra Mariani”, RFI, 18 April 2012.  
207 See “AQIM leader gives advice to fighters in Azawad”, 
SITE Monitoring Service, 23 May 2012; and “Qaeda leader 
tells fighters to support Mali rebels”, Reuters, 24 May 2012.  
208 See “Timbuktu couple get 100 lashes for child out of wed-
lock”, AFP, 20 June 2012.  
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tions, as in Gao in mid-May.209 The approach thus seems 
less and less incremental. How far will these movements 
go in imposing Sharia? Does AQIM intend to use Ansar 
Dine as a security cordon for its jihadi activities or does it 
intend to extend a political model combining Sharia and 
jihadism to neighbouring areas? Finally, is it possible to 
impose on northern Mali a religious project that the MNLA’s 
political leaders perceive as being the replacement of south-
ern “colonisation” by Arab Islamist “colonisation?”210 
B. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY  
AT SIXES AND SEVENS 
African regional organisations began to mobilise after the 
MNLA attacked Malian army positions in the north in early 
2012 and government forces and President ATT showed 
they were clearly unable to deal with the situation. Mean-
while, the UN had for several months become increasingly 
concerned about the general security situation in the Sahel, 
in the context of the conflict in Libya and the considera-
ble transfers of arms and fighters from that country. The 
UN Secretary-General and the AU Commission had sent 
a joint multidisciplinary mission to the Sahel, between 7 
and 23 December 2011, to assess the impact of the Libyan 
crisis on neighbouring countries.211 The AU Commission 
then organised a ministerial level consultation between 
the region’s governments and other stakeholders in Addis 
Ababa, on 29 January 2012, to examine the mission’s re-
port and recommendations. However, events moved very 
quickly in Mali and several participants at a ministerial 
meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (PCS) held 
in Bamako on 20 March were still there when the coup 
occurred on 22 March.  
The desire for coordinated international action was ex-
pressed in the PCS’s call for the establishment “under the 
aegis of the AU and United Nations of a support and fol-
low-up group comprising all the neighbouring countries, 
the relevant Regional Economic Communities (ECOWAS 
and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, CEN-SAD), 
as well as the international partners concerned”.212 This 
group only met for the first time on 7 June 2012 in Abid-
 
209 “Mali: plusieurs blessés à Gao après des manifestations 
contre les groupes armés”, Jeune Afrique, 14 May 2012.  
210 Mossa Ag Attaher, “Pourquoi je rejette l’accord avec Ansar 
Dine”, toumastpress, 31 May 2012. http://toumastpress.com/autres/ 
lettre-ouverte/722-moussa-ag-attaher-pourquoi-je-rejette-accord-
ansar-dine.html. 
211 “Declaration on the situation in the Sahel region”, African 
Union Peace and Security Council, 314th ministerial meeting, 
Bamako, Mali, 20 March 2012.  
212 Communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Coun-
cil, 314th ministerial meeting, Bamako, Mali, 20 March 2012.  
jan.213 Behind the façade of unity that characterised the 
international community’s response, which condemned 
both the rebellion in the north and the coup in Bamako, 
there was a wide range of views about what should be 
done to contain the crisis.  
ECOWAS was initially recognised as best placed to start 
negotiations. However, the controversial approach of its 
Burkina Faso mediator (see Section V.B) led to the broad-
ening of the diplomatic framework for resolving the cri-
sis, to include the AU and then the UN Security Council. 
This shift in the level of diplomatic intervention coincided 
with the promotion of an increasingly belligerent agenda 
by some parties, a position championed by Niger and which 
led to the promise of mobilising 3,300 troops from Niger, 
Senegal, Nigeria and perhaps Côte d’Ivoire.214 Senegal 
later backtracked and, at the beginning of July, its newly-
elected president, Macky Sall, declared that his country’s 
soldiers were already involved in many external opera-
tions.215 Meanwhile, the Burkina Faso government con-
tinued to negotiate with actors in northern Mali.216  
Burkina Faso and Niger, which hold the most extreme 
positions within ECOWAS, respectively in favour of a 
political settlement and a military solution, were both 
defending their own particular interests. Blaise Compaoré 
is trying to preserve his status as undisputed mediator of 
regional conflicts from which he draws the international 
support necessary for his political survival within his own 
country.  
Niger’s position is complex. President Issoufou has a Marx-
ist, secular and anti-ethnic ideological education. This coun-
try is also at the crossroads of the transnational terrorist 
threats (Libyan and Nigerian connections). Finally, his 
government is getting a lot of international attention after 
the successful democratic transition that brought him to 
power in April 2011. His “security and development” 
program receives major international funding.217 France 
also has a strategic interest in Niger because of its urani-
 
213 Chaired by the president of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, 
the meeting brought together ECOWAS members, non-members 
(Mauritania and Algeria), the AU chair (Benin), permanent 
members of the UN Security Council and AU states currently 
sitting on the Security Council. See “Inaugural meeting of the 
support and follow-up group on the situation in Mali”, Abidjan, 
Côte d’Ivoire, 7 June 2012. 
214 “Mali : l’Afrique de l’Ouest envisage d’envoyer une force 
de 3.300 éléments”, Jeune Afrique, 16 June 2012. 
215 “Mali : le Sénégal ne prévoit pas d’envoyer des troupes”, 
Afriscoop, 10 July 2012.  
216 “Nord du Mali : Ansar Dine accepte de négocier”, Le Monde, 
18 June 2012. 
217 EU funding of Niger is much higher than funds promised to 
Mali. See “A Coherent Strategy for the Sahel”, European Par-
liament, Brussels, 2012. 
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um mines, exploited by the French nuclear energy com-
pany, Areva. Issoufou resolutely supports a firm approach 
to security issues. He seeks to enhance his credibility as a 
reliable regional partner in the “war on terror” and receiv-
ing any other dividends that may come his way in the pro-
cess. Nigeria, as it fights Boko Haram, also supports this 
position. Côte d’Ivoire, another regional power, seems 
anxious to assert itself vis-à-vis Blaise Compaoré who 
has been too involved in recent Ivorian history.218 
Algeria is a blind spot in diplomatic activity on the Sahel 
question. Its position is the subject of much speculation, 
which is more or less plausible but rarely supported by hard 
evidence.219 AQIM is an originally Algerian organisation, 
which should logically give Algeria a preponderant role in 
the “war on terror”. However, in practice, its involvement 
is not proportional to the considerable military resources 
at its disposal. Many analysts think the country is playing 
a “double game” that seeks, first, to perpetuate a domestic 
terrorist threat that could be used to demonise a possible 
“Algerian Spring” should one endanger the regime’s sur-
vival, and second, to ensure external military funding.220  
The Malian authorities and regional and international 
actors that have responded to the crisis therefore need to 
involve Algiers in the search for solutions to the crisis in 
northern Mali. Prime Minister Modibo Diarra visited Al-
giers on 12 June 2012.221 On 15 July, it was the turn of the 
French foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, to visit Algiers. 
One of his immediate priorities is Mali.222 While he de-
clared on 12 July in Paris that the use of force in northern 
Mali was probable “at some stage or other”,223 the Algerian 
authorities always clearly insist on their preference for a 
“political solution”.224  
At the end of a meeting of heads of diplomacy of the coun-
tries of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) on 10 July, the 
 
218 Crisis Group interview, Ivorian political analyst, Abidjan, 31 
May 2012. 
219 See, for example, “La mystérieuse politique de l’Algérie au 
Mali”, Le Nouvel Observateur, 12 July 2012.  
220 L. Aïda Ammour, “Regional Security Cooperation in the Ma-
ghreb and Sahel: Algeria’s Pivotal Ambivalence”, Africa Secu-
rity Brief, no. 18 (2012). Also see “A Coherent Strategy for the 
Sahel”, op. cit.  
221 “Mali-Algérie : Cheick Modibo Diarra demande l’aide du 
président Bouteflika”, Jeune Afrique, 14 June 2012. 
222 “Visite de Laurent Fabius à Alger: Divergences sur le Mali et 




223 “Nord-Mali : utilisation probable de la force ‘à un moment 
ou à un autre’ (Fabius)”, AFP, 12 July 2012.  
224 “Mali : ‘fortes chances’ de trouver une solution politique à 
la crise (Algérie)”, AFP, 10 July 2012.  
Algerian foreign minister, Mourad Medelci, said the Ma-
ghreb countries were “convinced” of the need for a political 
solution and that “a dialogue between the Malian govern-
ment and parties is necessary”.225 The Algerian minister 
of Maghreb and African affairs, Abdelkader Messahel, 
went further and stated in an interview that it was possi-
ble to negotiate with the MNLA and Ansar Dine and that 
the latter’s leader, Iyad Ag Ghali, was “an interlocutor 
like any other”.226  
It is important to ensure that external strategic agendas do 
not hinder diplomatic efforts to help Mali. The UN Secu-
rity Council correctly perceived the ambiguities in the 
situation when rejecting, on several occasions, AU and 
ECOWAS requests for a mandate for military interven-
tion.227 France, which is the permanent council member 
most actively engaged in the Malian crisis, pressed for the 
adoption of Resolution 2056 of 5 July 2012, under Chapter 
7 of the Charter. The resolution does not provide for the 
immediate use of force to restore Mali’s territorial integri-
ty, but instead reaffirms the need for a civilian government 
in Bamako and provides for targeted sanctions against in-
dividuals and groups associated with AQIM.228  
C. HALT THE DECLINE OF THE  
MALIAN STATE AND PREVENT  
REGIONAL DESTABILISATION 
The Malian crisis is of unusual complexity as deep fault 
lines run through Mali on so many levels. The macro divi-
sion between north and south adds to micro divisions in 
each camp while the international actors (neighbouring 
countries, ECOWAS, AU, UN) are finding it difficult to 
agree on a joint response. Moreover, although a military 
option exists, the countries in the region that could poten-
tially contribute military personnel are exposed to the risk 
of discontent in their own armed forces, which are not 
aligned with the wishes of their political elites.229 
In the field, the situation is all the more confused because 
the actors have only a limited appreciation of the implica-
tions of their own decisions. In a tragic irony, three months 
after the MNLA launched its offensive, it finds itself over-
whelmed by an Islamist force that it initially disregarded 
but is now unable to contain. In March 2012, the coup 
leaders in Bamako, led by Captain Sanogo, announced 
their goal of recovering control over Mali’s territory but 
 
225 Ibid.  
226 “Abdelkader Messahel : ‘L’Algérie n’a pas les moyens de 
régler les problèmes du Mali’”, Jeune Afrique, 13 July 2012.  
227 Security Council press statement on Mali, SC/10676, 18 
June 2012. 
228 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2056, 5 July 
2012.  
229 Crisis Group interview, Abidjan, 5 June 2012. 
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only strengthened the position of the armed separatist 
groups that, one week after the coup, took control of the 
north’s three provincial capitals, bringing about the de 
facto partition of the country. 
1. Get the Malian state back on its feet 
What options are available that could de-escalate the Ma-
lian conflict? The surest way of failing would be to ignore 
the local causes of the conflict and operate instead on the 
basis of an external frame of reference. Some observers 
who refer to the “Somalisation” or “Afghanisation” of 
Mali, and the leaders of neighbouring countries who say 
that the country is currently suffering from “external ag-
gression”, reinforce this dangerous tendency.230 While the 
former display intellectual laziness, there are suspicions 
that the latter want to use the “war on terror” for their own 
purposes. They must not prevent or interfere with Malian 
ownership of state rebuilding.  
Depoliticise the security forces  
However desirable a thorough review of the way power is 
exercised in Mali would be, this will only be possible if the 
non-partisan nature of the security forces is re-established, 
thereby guaranteeing democracy and respect for transi-
tional institutions. The reconstruction of a coherent chain 
of command is a priority, not only to promote political 
stabilisation in the south but also to settle the crisis in the 
north. There is a need to dilute the political divisions that 
run through the security forces and this could be done 
with support from regional and international actors. In 
order to preserve the operational capacity of the civilian 
authorities in the short term, provision should be made to 
strengthen the security of the president,231 the prime min-
ister and members of the government by establishing a 
clear chain of command for this task. External support in 
this regard is undoubtedly necessary. ECOWAS should 
negotiate with the Malian authorities about how this can 
take place while avoiding the replacement of the entire 
Malian gendarmerie and police force by regional troops.  
Create an executive power that represents  
a broad consensus  
If the republican reorganisation of the security forces is to 
be carried out in a credible way, the civilian actors in the 
transition will need to show they can fulfil their responsi-
bilities. This means breaking with past corrupt practices 
 
230 For example, the president of Niger, Mamadou Issoufou, 
told France 24: “The president of Niger is ready to intervene 
militarily in Mali ‘in the last resort’”, France 24, 7 June 2012. 
231 At the time of writing, President Traoré was still in Paris, 
officially to receive medical treatment following the assault on 
21 May 2012.  
that, from the point of view of part of the general public, 
legitimised the coup led by Captain Sanogo. The views of 
all sectors of society should be taken into account because 
it is crucial that the state regain its legitimacy in the eyes 
of its citizens. After ECOWAS was initially involved in 
the hasty formation of the Diarra government and after 
Burkina Faso’s mediation allowed itself to be too influ-
enced by the junta and Captain Sanogo, a government 
reshuffle is necessary and ECOWAS should call for a 
government of national unity. Precious time has been lost, 
but it is not too late to provide the country with a govern-
ment that has a broader political base and that is capable 
of proposing a roadmap for the transition.  
Begin a dialogue with the political forces of the north  
The disconnection between the north and south is repara-
ble. In the south, there are initiatives to promote dialogue 
with representatives of the north and they should be sup-
ported. One of the most credible of these initiatives is the 
Coalition for Mali created on 26 May 2012. It unites po-
litical parties, intellectuals, independent prominent indi-
viduals of all origins, in addition to the Collective of the 
Elected Representatives of the North (Collectif des élus 
du Nord), the Collective of Northern Citizens (Collectif 
des ressortissants du Nord, COREN), organisations of na-
tionals of the seven circles of the Western Sahel and the 
Coordination of Arab Communities of Mali (Coordina-
tion des communautés arabes du Mali).232 The leaders of 
this coalition distance themselves from the emotional and 
vengeful discourse on the problems of the north promoted 
by others and treat the situation as a genuine national ques-
tion that requires the greatest possible consensus in the 
south about what is negotiable and what is not negotiable 
with the north. The establishment and domination of Is-
lamist and terrorist groups does not mean that questions 
over the reintegration of different northern Malian com-
munities into the nation should be ignored.  
 
232 The coalition’s board has 47 members and is chaired by 
Gabouné Keïta, a member of civil society. Tiébilé Dramé, pres-
ident of the Party for National Renaissance (Parti pour la re-
naissance nationale, PARENA) is its first vice president and 
Mohamed Mohamoud El Oumrani, representative of the Arab 
communities, is the second vice president. Several former prime 
ministers of Mali are also members. A college of religious dig-
nitaries (Imam Mahmoud Dicko, Monseigneur Jean Zerbo, 
Chérif El Madani Haïdara, El Hadj Sidi Konaké) has also been 
created. See Aguibou Sogodogo and Boukary Daou, “Naissance 
de la Coalition pour le Mali”, Le Républicain, 28 May 2012.  
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2. In the north: promoting a political  
approach while pursuing the restoration  
of military capacity  
The hawkish solution to the crisis in the north, which in-
volves hastily seeking to restore a military force able to 
conquer the lost territory, should be immediately discard-
ed. An external armed intervention is likely to result in 
more civilian victims and aggravate the dangerously frag-
ile situation of the entire country, even though most of the 
population is in the south. It would also carry a high risk 
of contagion and radicalisation. Former Nigerien Tuareg 
fighters, who have been waiting since 2009 for their gov-
ernment to “integrate” them,233 could be tempted to resume 
the armed struggle. In addition, although ECOWAS has 
so far shown a façade of unity, it is not certain that there 
is consensus about an armed option either among member 
states or between the civilian governments and the armed 
forces within member states.  
The reconstitution in Nigerien territory of a counter-
insurgency force led by Alaji Gamou coupled with the 
Manichaean analysis presented by President Issoufou234 
seems to indicate that Niamey is promoting a hawkish op-
tion. Meanwhile, Burkina Faso is continuing its efforts to 
promote dialogue between representatives of the armed 
groups in the north and political actors in Bamako. In the 
absence of a regional consensus, the possibility of a low 
intensity “proxy war” exists, which would turn Mali into 
a theatre of more or less latent confrontations between 
armed groups with each of them benefiting from interna-
tional ramifications. Such a scenario would be devastating 
for Mali and its people. It would be especially disastrous 
if the government was to rearm the Imghad or Ganda Izo 
militias that have already caused so much violence and 
thereby end the possibility of dialogue in northern Mali for 
a long time to come.  
At the political level, attempts by the two main armed 
groups (MNLA and Ansar Dine) to iron out their differ-
ences, as in Gao in mid-May 2012, were, in theory, wel-
comed. The move indicated that a political process was 
underway, which Malian and external actors could try to 
 
233 During the summer of 2009, Colonel Qadhafi ended the re-
bellion of the Nigerien Movement for Justice (Mouvement des 
Nigériens pour la justice) by distributing assets to their chiefs 
and fighters in exchange for their disarmament. Measures to 
stabilise the region on a lasting basis should have followed but 
there was no written agreement and the promises were not kept 
because of the overthrow of Qadhafi. International donors, no-
tably the EU, and the Nigerien government are currently (June 
2012) releasing funds to pay for an ambitious “security and de-
velopment” program that is supposed to respond to the coun-
try’s needs. 
234 “Le président du Niger prêt à intervenir militairement au 
Mali ‘en dernier recours’”, op. cit. 
influence by presenting their hopes regarding the outcome. 
The door quickly closed as Ansar Dine gained the upper 
hand over the MNLA and opted for an increasingly hard-
line anti-Western position.235 It is important to clarify 
whether Iyad Ag Ghali’s positions displayed in the media 
are accurate. It should also be taken into account that he 
deliberately adopts ambiguous views to reduce his ad-
versaries’ chances of weakening him. To engage him in a 
transparent discussion would pressure him to begin to 
clarify his objectives, which he has purposely kept vague 
for political gain.  
Preliminary contacts between Burkinabè envoys and MNLA 
representatives at the beginning of April 2012 suggested 
that the separatist movement will only negotiate with Ba-
mako if the latter recognises its independence. Such an 
outcome would be inconceivable for the international com-
munity.236 This position was reiterated at meetings in 
Nouakchott between MNLA representatives and Mauri-
tanian237 and Malian representatives.238 Since then, the 
movement has lost the upper hand, politically and militar-
ily. The commitment to respect Mali’s territorial integrity 
initially made by Iyad Ag Ghali means that his project is at 
first glance more acceptable than the MNLA’s separatist 
intransigence. However, this project’s hardline Islamist 
agenda and proximity with AQIM are unacceptable.  
Are these choices irreversible? A permanent aspect of the 
Sahel armed groups’ social profile is their extreme fluidity: 
alliances are made and broken extremely quickly and loy-
alties are bought and sold on the basis of ideological, tribal 
and economic ties. An exclusively military approach is not 
adequate for a situation of such social and political com-
plexity and would only add one more armed actor to an 
already confused situation. The pattern of volatile and 
uncertain alliances at least has the advantage of providing 
constant opportunities for dialogue. Discussions between 
Bamako and non-terrorist armed groups in the north must 
precede any attempt at armed conquest of the territory.  
Although Mali’s sovereignty is certainly at stake, its bor-
ders are not disputed: there is at least a baseline agreement 
 
235 According to a witness close to the negotiations in Gao, Iyad 
Ag Ghali dismissed the risk of a Western-backed military in-
tervention, saying he would be able to obtain support from Ar-
ab countries to counter this prospect. Crisis Group telephone 
interview, 2 June 2012. 
236 Crisis Group interview, London, 5 April 2012. 
237 “MNLA à Nouakchott: seules les modalités d’organisation 




238 “Négociations avec le MNLA: Tiébilé Dramé ouvre le bal”, 
Maliweb.net, 16 April 2012, http://www.maliweb.net/news/armee/ 
2012/04/16/article,60533.html. 
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about the territory that the protagonists are contesting. It 
would be best to facilitate dialogue between Malians in 
Mali rather than entrust the coordination of this dialogue 
to biased regional powers. External actors, for example, 
the UN, that are neutral and legitimate in the eyes of par-
ties concerned, could facilitate this process. What is re-
quired is not the kind of “sponsoring” of accords that has 
been done so many times before, but rather the establish-
ment of a sustainable basis for a constructive dialogue, 
the terms and objectives of which should be prepared by 
the protagonists themselves. It is likely that Mali will not 
be able to resolve this crisis without having a fundamen-
tal rethink about the basis of the national social contract 
between the north and south. That assumes putting an end 
to remote-control governance through dubious criminal 
and mafia intermediaries in the north. 
The surest way for Ansar Dine and the MNLA to show 
they really intended to combat terrorism would be to take 
the initiative and drive out AQIM from northern Mali. 
However, there are not many reasons to believe this is go-
ing to happen. The MNLA’s preferred diplomatic lever is 
that of the anti-terrorist struggle, as proposed to the inter-
national community (more precisely to the Western pow-
ers) but the movement has been seriously weakened in the 
field. Ansar Dine is closely allied to AQIM and it is unlikely 
that this alliance can be broken in the short term. But Ansar 
Dine has twice taken the initiative regarding the release of 
Western hostages, although, this confirms both how close 
it is to AQIM and its median position between the jihadis 
and the West. This arrangement was, however, perhaps 
nothing more than an opportunistic chance to raise funds. 
That is why it is necessary to ask the Ansar Dine leaders 
to specify their political intentions. Do they have anything 
else to offer other than an adjustment of the religious sta-
tus quo in the north, coupled with impunity for traffickers 
and terrorists? There are few signs of a positive develop-
ment in this respect. 
3. Harmonise international action and avoid  
doing more harm than good  
International actors must not deprive Malians of control 
over their own future. Such a development would risk cre-
ating political space for internal populist forces that are 
hostile to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, even with 
armed Malian groups. In this context, it is a priority to alter 
the framework for international mediation, currently led 
by ECOWAS, in order to promote dialogue between Ma-
lians. The “core countries” (Mauritania, Algeria, Niger) 
that influence the Malian political situation should be asked 
to harmonise their positions and avoid “free-rider” strate-
gies (ie, content that turmoil is occurring in one’s neigh-
bours’ territory instead of one’s own). This reasoning must 
be complemented by resolute and targeted cooperation on 
the anti-terrorist struggle, based on sharing information 
and facilitating rapid action to control and eliminate trans-
border trafficking and gradually asphyxiate criminal and 
terrorist organisations, while preserving economic oppor-
tunities for the local population.  
AQIM has created a significant place for itself in the local 
political economy, but it would not be a good idea to pun-
ish the local population economically at the same time that 
action is taken to eliminate the group. The construction of 
a response to the terrorist threat should not yield to exter-
nal pressure (U.S., French, European), which would un-
duly benefit some actors. Algeria should put its massive 
(compared to its neighbours) military and technological 
resources to work as part of a collective and sincere ini-
tiative in the anti-terrorist struggle. The Joint Operational 
Committee of Chiefs of Staff (Comité d’état-major opé-
rationnel conjoint, CEMOC) formed in Tamanrasset to 
coordinate the anti-terrorist struggle between Algeria, Mau-
ritania, Mali and Niger is underused and should be made 
operational. The army commanders in these four coun-
tries met in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on 11 July 2012 to 
“examine how to help the Republic of Mali recover sov-
ereignty over all of its national territory” but no specific 
measures were announced.239  
CEMOC’s field of surveillance could be extended to areas 
located on the edge of the Sahel such as northern Nigeria, 
in cooperation with the Nigerian authorities, where the ter-
rorist group Boko Haram is active. Morocco, Tunisia and 
Libya, all members of the UMA along with Mauritania 
and Algeria, should join the anti-terrorist mobilisation. 
However, Algeria is the regional power that has most easily 
to hand the resources required to weaken the terrorist 
groups that operate on its southern border. In current cir-
cumstances, the political and military authorities in Algiers 
should end the ambiguity regarding their perception of 
the seriousness of the threat posed by AQIM and send a 
clear signal of support to the reestablishment, even gradual, 
of Malian sovereignty over its northern territory.  
Following the PSPSDN’s failure, one of the EU’s medium-
term objectives is to review the methods for designing and 
implementing “security and development” programs as 
part of its strategy for the Sahel, along with other donors. 
Another medium-term objective is to change the policy of 
paying ransoms in exchange for the release of hostages. 
These ransoms have clearly strengthened the military posi-
tion of the terrorists and attached the Malian state to politi-
cal and mafia networks that have an interest in the perpet-
uation of this system.  
 
239 “Nord du Mali : les chefs des armées de 4 pays du Sahel ré-
unis à Nouakchott”, AFP, 11 July 2012.  
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However, in the immediate future, international actors 
should provide political, financial and logistical support 
for reconstructing the legitimacy of the state in southern 
Mali, including the defence and security forces. They should 
also facilitate dialogue between those actors in the north 
and south who reject a violent escalation of the conflict – 
which would only benefit extreme political forces – and 
strive to define a political solution to the crisis. ECOWAS 
and the AU have officially referred the matter to the UN 
Security Council and asked it to “authorise the deploy-
ment of an ECOWAS stabilisation force”.240 But the coun-
cil should first use all available instruments to promote an 
inter-Malian political process based on the principles set 
out by the Support and Follow-up Group at its meeting in 
Abidjan: respect for the unity and territorial integrity of 
Mali, rejection of recourse to armed rebellion and the fight 
against terrorist and criminal networks “which must be 
neutralised by all possible legitimate means”.241  
The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2056 on 
5 July was good news in the sense that it created a frame-
work for resolving the crisis, focused on rebuilding politi-
cal legitimacy in Bamako and did not provide hasty back-
ing for the option of military intervention proposed by 
ECOWAS. The international community should now de-
ploy the threat of individual sanctions against both terrorist 
actors in the north and opponents of political normalisation 
in the south, request the establishment of an international 
commission of inquiry into human rights violations in both 
the north and south, declare clear and strong support for 
the Malian civilian government by resuming external aid, 
protect the transitional institutions and take immediate 
steps to promote the restructuring and training of the Mali-
an army. Even if it is not called on to reconquer the north 
by arms, in current circumstances Mali will need reorgan-
ised, re-equipped defence and security forces subject to 
civilian political power in order to completely resolve this 
unprecedented crisis.  
 
240 Security Council press statement on Mali, op. cit. 
241 Conclusions of the inaugural meeting of the Support and 
Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali, op. cit.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
Mali has descended into a serious and difficult political 
situation, caused by overlapping and interlocking factors 
that have local, national and international dimensions. Un-
derstanding this complexity is a prerequisite for reasoned 
action by political actors both within and outside Mali to 
resolve the crisis. Nothing would be worse for the country 
and the entire sub-region than to replace efforts to make an 
informed analysis with a uniform approach of anti-terrorist 
repression that ignores the nuances and the often legitimate 
political demands of Malian political actors in the north 
and south. Attempts to solve the crisis face the dual chal-
lenge of raising the profile and strengthening the forces 
that want to see a negotiated settlement of the conflicts 
that permeate Malian society while neutralising internal 
and external supporters of radicalisation. 
Dakar/Brussels, 18 July 2012
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
ADEMA  Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali/Alliance for Democracy in Mali 
ADEMA-PASJ  Alliance pour la démocratie au Mali-Parti africain pour la solidarité et la justice/ 
Alliance for Democracy in Mali – African Party for Solidarity and Justice 
AQIM  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
ARLA  Armée révolutionnaire de l’Azawad/Azawad Revolutionary Army 
ATT  Amadou Toumani Touré 
AU  African Union 
CARE  Convergence africaine pour le renouveau/African Convergence for Renewal 
CEMOC  Comité d’état-major opérationnel conjoint/Joint Operational Committee of Chiefs of Staff 
CNID  Congrès national d’initiative démocratique/National Congress of Democratic Initiative  
CNRDRE Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l’Etat/ 
National Committee for the Reestablishment of Democracy and the Restoration of the State 
CNT  Conseil national de transition/National Transitional Council 
CODEM  Convergence pour le développement du Mali/Convergence for the Development of Mali 
COPAM  Coordination des organisations patriotiques du Mali/Coordination of Patriotic Organisations of Mali 
COREN  Collectif des Ressortissants du Nord/Collective of Northern Citizens 
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States 
EU  European Union 
FIAA  Front islamique armé de l’Azawad/Azawad Armed Islamic Front 
GMS  Groupe mobile de sécurité/Mobile Security Group  
GSPC  Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat/Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
IBK  Ibrahim Boubacar Keita 
MNA  Mouvement national de l’Azawad/National Movement of Azawad 
MNLA  Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad/National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
MPA  Mouvement populaire de l’Azawad/Popular Movement of Azawad 
MP 22  Mouvement populaire du 22 mars/Popular Movement of 22 March 
MPR  Mouvement patriotique pour le renouveau/Patriotic Movement for Renewal 
MRRA  Mouvement républicain pour la restauration de l’Azawad/Republican Movement for  
the Restoration of Azawad 
MUJAW  Movement for Unicity and Jihad in West Africa 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
ORTM  Office de radiodiffusion et télévision du Mali/Mali Radio and Television Corporation 
PARENA  Parti pour la renaissance nationale/Party for National Recovery 
PDES  Parti pour le développement économique et social/Party for Economic and Social Development 
PSI  Pan Sahel Initiative 
PSPSDN  Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement au Nord-Mali/ 
Special Programme for Peace, Security and Development in Northern Mali 
RDM  Rassemblement pour le développement du Mali/Rally for the Development of Mali 
SADI  Solidarité africaine pour la démocratie et l’indépendance/African Solidarity for Democracy  
and Independence 
UEMOA  Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa 
URD  Union pour la République et la démocratie/Union for the Republic and Democracy 
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FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  




The ECOWAS Mediator on the one hand, 
And 
The Comité National de Redressement de la Démocratie et de la Restauration de l’Etat on the other hand, 
Considering that return to constitutional order shall be achieved through the respect for the provisions of the Constitu-
tion of 25 February 1992, where Article 36 establishes who shall act as President of the Republic in the event of a pow-
er vacuum or incapacity. 
Recalling that Article 36 states that “When the President of the Republic is temporarily prevented from carrying out his 
duties, his powers shall provisionally be exercised by the Prime Minister. 
In the event that the position of President of the Republic becomes vacant for any reason whatsoever or in the event of 
complete and final incapacity determined by the Constitutional Court which has been approved by the Speaker of the 
National Assembly and the Prime Minister, the duties of the President of the Republic shall be performed by the Speak-
er of the National Assembly.  
A new President shall be elected for a new tenure of five years. 
The election of the new President shall take place within twenty-one (21) days at least and forty days at most after the 
official notification of the vacancy of the definitive incapacity. 
No matter the incapacity or vacancy, Articles 38, 41, 42 and 50 of this Constitution shall not apply.”  
The ECOWAS Mediator and the Comité National de Redressement de la Démocratie et de la Restauration de l’Etat 
(CNRDRE) agreed to adopt this Framework Agreement for the Implementation of the Solemn Commitment of 1 April 
2012 as follows: 
Chapter 1:  
Application of the provisions of Article 36 of the Constitution 
 
Article 1 
The President of the Republic shall officially resign. 
 
Article 2 
The President of the CNRDRE in accordance with his solemn declaration of 1 April 2012 shall initiate the process for 
the application of Article 36 of the Constitution of 25 February 1992; 
 
Article 3 
In keeping with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Constitution, the Speaker of the National Assembly 
and the Prime Minister shall inform the Constitutional Court of the resignation of the President to establish the power 
vacuum. 
 
The Constitutional Court, referring to provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Constitution, shall establish the va-
cancy. 
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The Speaker of the National Assembly shall be sworn in by the Constitutional Court as actign President of the Republic, 
and shall be made responsible for the organisation of Presidential elections within the constitutional period of 40 days. 
 
Chapter II:  
Establishment of Organs for the Transition 
 
Article 5 
In light of the unusual circumstances in which the country finds itself, given the institutional crisis and the armed rebel-
lion in the North that has seriously affected the regular functioning of the institutions of the Republic and as elections 
cannot be organised within the forty days stipulated by the Constitution, a political transition must be organised which 
shall lead to free, democratic and transparent elections across the national territory. 
 
Article 6 
Subject to the conditions of Article 5 above, the signatories to this Agreement hereby decide to create the following or-
gans for the transition. These organs shall lead the transition until the organisation of the Presidential Elections with a 
duly reviewed voters’ register that is accepted by all. 
 
a) A Prime Minister for the Transition, Head of the Government and plenipotentiary shall be appointed. The Prime 
Minister shall lead the transition, manage the crisis in the North of Mali and organise free, transparent and dem-
ocratic elections, in keeping with a road map. 
b) A Government of National Unity for the Transition, of consensus personalities, responsible for the implementa-
tion of the road map to end the crisis; 
c) The Government of National Unity shall support the provision of humanitarian assistance; 
d) The signatories, in consultation with all stakeholders shall agree on a road map for the transition which shall in-
clude the: 
– duration and calendar of the transition; 
– operational duties of the various organs so as to ensure a peaceful transition; 
– modalities for the elections for a return to normalcy; 
– review of the voters’ register; 
 
e) The role and position of the members of the CNRDRE during the transition period should be defined. 
 
Chapter III:  
Adoption of Support Legislative Measures 
 
Article 7 
In a country experiencing war, where elections need to be organised smoothly across the national territory and consoli-
date social cohesion and national unity, a certain number of legislative texts to support the transition process shall be 
passed by the National Assembly: 
a) A legislation for general amnesty applicable to the members of the CNRDRE and their associates; 
b) A legislation providing for the compensation of victims of the war and the uprising of 22 March 2012; 
c) A legislation extending the tenure of the parliamentarians to the end of the transition; 
d) A legislation on military orientation and programming for the organisation and equipment of the Army; 
e) A legislation establishing a military committee to monitor the reform of the defence and security forces. 
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Chapter IV:  
Commitments of Signatories 
 
Article 8 
The Comité National de Redressement de la Démocratie et de la Restauration de l’Etat (CNRDRE) shall implement 
this agreement under the auspices of the ECOWAS Mediator and with the support of the international community. 
 
Article 9 
Once this agreement is signed, the current Chairman of ECOWAS shall take the necessary steps to lift the sanctions im-
posed on Mali during the Summit of 29 March 2012. 
 
Article 10 
Given the severe humanitarian crisis, the current Chairman of ECOWAS shall provide Mali with funds for humanitarian 
assistance and shall seek to obtain appropriate humanitarian support from technical and financial partners of Mali and 
the international Community. 
 




Yipène Djibrill Bassole  Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo 
For ECOWAS Mediator and by delegation  For the Comité National de  
Minister of Foreign Affairs and  Redressement de la  
Regional Cooperation of  Démocratie et de la  
Burkina Faso  Restauration de l’Etat 
  (CNRDRE) 
   
…………………………………………………  …………………………………………….. 
In the presence of   In the presence of 
Adama Bictogo   Dr Mohammed Nurudeen 
Minister of African Integration   Minister of State in the Ministry of  
   Foreign Affairs 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire   Federal Republic of Nigeria 
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The former Sudanese Republic becomes 
the Republic of Mali and proclaims inde-
pendence. Modibo Keïta is appointed 
president of the Republic and the consti-
tution is adopted. 
1962-64 
In the north, the first Tuareg rebellion, 
the Fellagha rebellion in the regions of 
Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu is violently 
repressed. Government troops make no 
distinction between Tuareg fighters and 
civilians. The conflict provokes a mas-
sive exodus of Tuaregs towards neigh-
bouring countries, particularly Algeria.  
19 November 1968 
A military coup overthrows Modibo 
Keïta. Lieutenant Moussa Traoré be-
comes president and installs a military 
regime.  
1976 
Moussa Traoré creates a political party, 
the Union démocratique du peuple ma-
lien (UDPM). Mali adopts a single-party 
system. 
June 1985 
Moussa Traoré is re-elected without op-
position and with 89 per cent of votes. A 
new Tuareg rebellion breaks out in Mali 
and Niger. Tuareg attack on Tchintaba-
radene in Niger.  
1988  
Mouvement populaire de l’Azawad 
(MPLA) created in Libya and led by Iyad 
Ag Ghali.  
May 1990  
The Tuareg of northern Niger attack 
Tchintabaradene. Hundreds of Tuareg 
killed in Niger as a result of severe mili-
tary reprisals.  
June 1990 
A Tuareg rebellion in Mali begins with 
the attack on Ménaka prison and garrison 
(in the north east, near the border with 
Niger). 
January 1991 
The Malian government and the Popular 
Movement of Azawad (MPA) sign a 
peace agreement with the Arab Islamic 
Front of Azawad (FIAA) in Tamanrasset 
(southern Algeria).  
March 1991 
Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani 
Touré, leading the Comité transitoire 
pour le salut du peuple (CTSP) over-
throws Moussa Traoré. 
July-August 1991 
The CTSP organises a national confer-
ence to discuss a new constitution and 
decide on an electoral timetable. 
April 1992 
The government signs the National Pact, 
which provides for an economic revival 
of the north and the integration of the 
Tuareg into military and civilian struc-
tures.  
Alpha Oumar Konaré wins the first dem-
ocratic elections. 
December 1993 
Lieutenant-Colonel Oumar Diallo leads 
an attempted coup.  
May 1994 
Despite a series of national and local 
peace initiatives, tension rises in the 
north, leading to the formation of the 
Mouvement patriotique Ganda Koy 
(MPGK), a mainly Songhaï militia.  
January 1995 
The MPGK and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Azawad (FPLA), a rebel 
Tuareg movement, sign the Bourem Ac-
cords.  
May 1997 
Alpha Oumar Konaré is re-elected for a 
second five-year term of office. 
June 2002 
General Amadou Toumani Touré, former 
president during the transition in 1991, is 
elected president.  
April 2006 
Malians criticise Colonel Muammar 
Qadhafi’s visit to Timbuktu and accuse 
him of supporting Tuareg rebellions.  
23 May 2006 
A new rebel movement, the Democratic 
Alliance for Change (ADC), led by Ibra-
him Ag Bahanga, attacks the garrison 
towns of Kidal and Ménaka.  
4 July 2006 
The government of Mali and the ADC 
sign the Algiers Accords. 
29 April 2007  
Amadou Toumani Touré is re-elected 
after a controversial electoral process. 
Opposition candidates challenge the re-
sults.  
May 2007 
Violence continues after the Alliance 
Touareg Niger-Mali (ATNM), a new fac-
tion, rejects the Algiers Accords.  
February 2009  
The government leads a successful coun-
ter-insurgency operation in the north.  
November 2010  
The National Azawad Movement (MNA) 
is founded. It rejects violence but calls 
for enthusiastic solidarity with Tuareg 
living in Mali and abroad.  
15 February 2011 
The Libyan crisis begins, leading to the 
fall of Qadhafi and the return of many 
fighters and civilians living in Libya. 
16 October 2011  
The National Movement for the Libera-
tion of Azawad (MNLA) is founded. It is 
formed by MNA leaders and Tuareg 
fighters returning from Libya, led by 
Colonel Ag Najim.  
17 January 2012  
The MNLA claims responsibility for at-
tacks on Ménaka in north-eastern Mali. 
1-2 February 2012  
Demonstrations in the town of Kati, near 
Bamako. Several Malian army garrisons 
are located in the town. Wives and rela-
tives of soldiers sent to fight the rebels in 
the north denounce the lack of arms and 
resources provided by the government. 
Criticism focuses on President Amadou 
Toumani Touré.  
8 February 2012 
MNLA rebels and the 23 May Alliance 
for Democracy and Change capture Tin-
zawaten, near the border with Algeria. 
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18 February 2012  
The MNLA attacks Hombori, a town lo-
cated on the main road between Mopti 
and Gao.  
10-11 March 2012  
The MNLA takes control of Tessalit as 
Malian soldiers carry out a “strategic re-
treat”.  
22 March 2012 
A group of soldiers overthrow ATT in 
the name of the National Committee for 
the Reestablishment of Democracy and 
the Restoration of the State (CNRDRE). 
Touré manages to escape from the presi-
dential palace after it is attacked by the 
mutineers. CNRDRE suspends the con-
stitution.  
23 March 2012  
The African Union suspends Mali. The 
leader of the junta, Captain Amadou 
Haya Sanogo, says he is ready to negoti-
ate with the rebels in the north as long as 
the country’s territorial integrity is pre-
served.  
26 March 2012  
The UN Security Council condemns the 
seizure of power by the CNRDRE and 
demands the restoration of constitutional 
order.  
29 March 2012  
ECOWAS issues a 72-hour ultimatum to 
CNRDRE to leave power and appoints 
President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina 
Faso as mediator. 
30 March 2012  
MNLA and Ansar Dine capture Kidal. 
2 April 2012 
ECOWAS leaders establish a complete 
economic embargo against Mali to put 
pressure on the junta.  
6 April 2012  
The MNLA declares the independence of 
Azawad in northern Mali and calls a uni-
lateral ceasefire.  
The military junta led by Sanogo and 
ECOWAS sign a framework agreement. 
12 April 2012  
The president of the National Assembly, 
Dioncounda Traoré, takes office as inter-
im president of the republic, following 
ATT’s formal resignation.  
20 May 2012  
ECOWAS and stakeholders seeking a 
solution to the crisis agree to extend the 
mandate of the interim president, Di-
oncounda Traoré, by one year. The 
Burkina Faso mediator announces that 
Captain Sanogo will be accorded the sta-
tus of a former head of state.  
21 May 2012  
Hostile demonstrators attack President 
Traoré in the presidential palace in re-
sponse to the decision to extend his man-
date to one year (rather than the 40-day 
interim period prescribed by the constitu-
tion in the event of the president’s resig-
nation). 
26 May 2012 
The MNLA and Ansar Dine announce 
they have concluded an agreement to 
merge the two movements and create the 
independent Islamic state of Azawad. 
1 June 2012  
MNLA leaders reject the agreement with 
Ansar Dine and reaffirm their option for 
a secular state, incompatible with Ansar 
Dine’s Islamist project.  
12 June 2012  
Demonstrators in Kidal call for the de-
parture of Ansar Dine and the return of 
the MNLA to the town. Ansar Dine’s 
“Islamic police” use whips to disperse 
the demonstrators. 
17-19 June 2012  
MNLA and Ansar Dine representatives 
and the mediator, Blaise Compaoré, have 
preliminary talks in Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso).  
29 June 2012  
Clashes with MUJWA fighters allied to 
Ansar Dine force the MNLA to leave 
Gao and then Timbuktu.  
29-30 June 2012  
Ansar Dine attacks the mausoleums of 
Muslim saints in Timbuktu.  
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